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I. INTRODUCTION
By the year 2050, the human population is expected to increase by
more than thirty-five percent.1 At present, we are thus simultaneously facing pressure for an efficient energy increase,2 while also trying
to adhere to an international regime to slow climate change.
The result is an international struggle between each State’s ability to provide efficient and reliable energy while also doing its part to
preserve the atmosphere. The major complication to all of this is the
question of how far each State will go to accomplish such efficient
energy: will a State stay within the bounds of its duties presented by
international environmental law and adhere to its duties for environmental and atmospheric preservation, or will it push further with
no adherence to either the law or recognition of the environmental
harm to its own territory or the territory of others?
This Comment will present and analyze international environmental law as it applies to the construction and use of hydroelectric
dams. Overall, this Comment will show that while there are relevant
laws, many times a harmed State still has no recourse. To demonstrate this conclusion, this Comment will first provide general background regarding hydroelectric dams and follow with an explanation
of the resulting benefits and harms, focusing primarily on environmental concerns. Second, this Comment will identify and thoroughly
analyze relevant sources of international environmental law, and it
will highlight both strengths and weaknesses of these sources. Third,
this Comment will offer specific examples of transboundary agree1. U.N. Dep’t of Econ. and Soc. Aff., Population Div., World Population Prospects:
The 2006 Revision Executive Summary, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/261/ES [hereinafter
World Population Prospects], available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/
wpp2006/English.pdf. Specifically, the 2006 Revision estimates that by 2050 the world
population will reach 9.2 billion from the 6.7 billion estimate at the time. Id.
2. In addition to needing more energy as a result of increased population, almost two
billion people do not have access to affordable energy services at all, particularly in developing countries. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME ET AL., WORLD ENERGY ASSESSMENT: OVERVIEW,
2004 UPDATE, at 34, U.N. Sales No. E.04.111.B.6 (2004) [hereinafter WORLD ENERGY
ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.undp.org/energy/docs/WEAOU_full.pdf; see also
World Population Prospects, supra note 1. Thus, an increase in energy sources is necessary
in order to alleviate significant health impacts, and such an increase may even raise the
level of education, especially for women and children. WORLD ENERGY ASSESSMENT, supra.
In order to cook, women and children are forced to spend long periods of time gathering
firewood and water. Id. Because of the physical energy required, “women and children often have no opportunities for education and other productive activities, while their health
suffers.” Id.
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ments or, in many situations, the lack of agreements. These examples will illustrate direct application of international laws and portray the extreme deficiencies in enforceability. Lastly, this Comment
will offer a brief conclusion regarding both a specific hydroelectric
dam dispute and the state of the relevant law in general.
II. BACKGROUND
Hydroelectric dams exist on international watercourses worldwide, and some States even use hydropower as their primary source
of energy.3 There are approximately 45,000 large dams in the world,
including both hydroelectric and nonhydroelectric dams.4 Between
1990 and 1997, hydropower generated approximately 18.5% of the
world’s electricity, and as of 2004, hydropower accounted for 16% of
the world’s energy production.5
While hydroelectric dams contribute to atmospheric preservation,
they still present much concern. Whether these benefits outweigh the
concerns is controversial, debatable, and a contributing factor to
many international political disputes. The main problem is addressing the issues that arise between States given the applicable international environmental law. While one State may determine that the
advantages of a particular hydroelectric dam outweighs the potential
disadvantages, another nation, also affected by the potential dam,
may not agree. The possibility for this scenario is quite likely since
nearly fifty percent of Earth’s land surface (not including Antarctica)
and sixty percent of all fresh water are part of transboundary water

3. ROY L. NERSESIAN, ENERGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
CONVENTIONAL AND ALTERNATIVE SOURCES 290-91 (2007) (noting that sixty-five countries
rely on hydropower for more than fifty percent of their electricity generation); see also
Mustafa Balat, Electricity from Worldwide Energy Sources, 1 ENERGY SOURCES PART B:
ECON. PLAN. & POL’Y 395, 401 (2006) (citing G. Bergkamp et al., Dams, Ecosystem Functions, and Environmental Restoration (2000)). Canada is the largest producer of hydroelectric power, followed by Norway and the United States. Id.
Hydroelectric power, also known as hydropower, refers to the process of using water’s energy to create electricity. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Wind and Hydropower Technologies
Program:
How
Hydropower
Works,
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/
hydro_how.html (last visited June 1, 2009) [hereinafter How Hydropower Works]. While
several types of hydropower plants exist, this Comment specifically pertains to hydroelectric dam use through an impoundment facility, which is the most common type of hydroelectric power facility. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Wind & Hydropower Technologies Program:
Types
of
Hydropower
Plants,
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/
hydro_plant_types.html (last visited June 1, 2009). Once a dam is built, a reservoir (an artificial man-made lake) is created on the upstream side of the dam. See id. When it is time
to generate electricity, water is released from the reservoir, moving through a turbine
creating energy. Id. This energy is then put onto the electrical grid and eventually used in
homes, businesses, and industries. How Hydropower Works, supra.
4. NERSESIAN, supra note 3, at 290-91.
5. Id. at 300.
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basins, meaning that the majority of Earth’s water is shared water.6
When faced with disputes, a harmed State is ultimately left only to
rely on sources of international environmental law for guidance.
III. BENEFITS OR HARMS: WHICH PREVAILS?
A. Benefits
In comparison to other existing forms of energy production, the
most notable benefit of hydropower is that hydroelectric dams do not
directly emit greenhouse gasses.7 Specifically, since water is the
main component of hydropower generation, burning of coal or use of
either oil or fuels is not necessary.8 Likewise, the water used—and
thus the river as a whole—is not polluted.9 Additionally, although
the construction of hydroelectric dams and their turbines is quite
costly,10 the cost of energy generation is rather inexpensive.11
In comparison to other sources of energy production, hydroelectric
dams also provide power that is both predictable and reliable.12
These dams allow the storage of water (in the reservoir) until it is
needed and then allow a rapid increase in energy production (more

6. Water
Encyclopedia,
Transboundary
Water
Treaties,
http://www.waterencyclopedia.com/St-Ts/Transboundary-Water-Treaties.html (last visited
June 1, 2009) (“A transboundary waterway is defined as all territory which contributes to a
stream, at least one of the tributaries of which crosses a boundary.”); see also LUDWIK A.
TECLAFF, THE RIVER BASIN IN HISTORY AND LAW 42-46 (1967) (emphasizing, through multiple examples, the vast amount of trade that was facilitated because of the existence of a
large number of transboundary rivers and noting that “[t]he influence of the physical unity
of the basin proved stronger than political divisions”).
7. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Wind and Hydropower Technologies Program: Advantages and Disadvantages of Hydropower, http://www1.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/
hydro_ad.html (last visited June 1, 2009); see also Thomas Moran, The Environmental and
Socio-Economic Impacts of Hydroelectric Dams in Turkish Kurdistan 24-25 (June 10, 2004)
(unpublished thesis, Roskilde University), available at http://rudar.ruc.dk/handle/1800/403.
8. See WILLIAM WHIPPLE, JR., WATER RESOURCES: A NEW ERA FOR COORDINATION
64-65 (1998); see also U.S. Dep’t of Energy, supra note 7.
9. See NERSESIAN, supra note 3, at 291.
10. Id.; see, e.g., NASA Satellites Watch as China Constructs Giant Dam,
June
13,
2007,
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/06/
SCIENCEDAILY,
070612134358.htm (stating that the total construction cost of the Three Gorges Dam on
the Yangtze River in China, which is now the largest hydroelectric dam in the world, was
at least $625 billion).
11. NERSESIAN, supra note 3, at 291 (noting that “hydropower has no fuel cost and a
low operating cost”); see also 25x’25, Why Renewables: Hydroelectric and Tidal Power,
http://www.25x25.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=19&Itemid=48 (last
visited June 1, 2009). “25x’25” is an alliance originally created by a group of farm leaders
who had a goal of obtaining twenty-five percent of America’s energy from renewable
sources—such as wind, solar, and biofuels—by 2025. About 25x’25, http://www.25x25.org/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=41 (last visited June 1, 2009).
Additionally, hydroelectric power can be highly automated. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy,
supra note 7 (noting that engineers can control the amount of water flowing through the
turbines to “produce electricity on demand”).
12. 25x’25, supra note 11.
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quickly than power plants using fossil fuel for energy production)
during periods of higher demand.13
Similar to other types of dams, hydroelectric dams also serve as a
flood control mechanism.14 Compared to a river functioning in its
natural state, a dam can maintain more water in the reservoir and
thus allow less water to move downstream.15 Many times, this can
protect downstream communities from flooding.16
Additional indirect benefits of hydroelectric dam construction are
that it “[e]nhances knowledge and improves management of valued
species due to study results” and that it can sometimes create new
freshwater ecosystems which are more productive.17 Immediately after floods, fish populations typically increase because the floods “enable fish to move out into floodplain[18] wetlands to feed and reproduce.”19 Similarly, floods recharge groundwater supplies and wetlands and natural fertilize farmland.20
B. Harms
Despite the undoubted benefits, many still feel that hydroelectric
dams present serious environmental concerns, which should be considered in conjunction.21
1. Methane Gas and Carbon Dioxide Emissions
Hydroelectric dams are considered a “clean” source of renewable
energy22 because they do not directly emit greenhouse gases. However, evidence that dams’ reservoirs emit methane gas may arguably
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. Id. But see infra text accompanying notes 84-86 (questioning dams’ efficacy in protecting downstream communities).
17. Moran, supra note 7, at 25.
18. A river’s floodplain is an important part of the river system. Institute for Ecological Health, Floodplain Management, http://www.instituteforecologicalhealth.org/
floodplain_management.html (last visited June 1, 2009). In a river’s natural state, “a dynamic river will move its course to and fro over a long time frame . . . . Riparian vegetation
and wetlands associated with streams and rivers are essential habitats for a great number
of animal and plant species.” Id.
19. Misty Herrin, The Nature Conservancy, China: Minimizing Dam Impact on the
Yangtze
River,
http://www.nature.org/wherewework/asiapacific/china/features/
yangtzedams.html (last visited June 1, 2009) (interview with Qiaoyu Gou, Project Manager, The Nature Conservancy’s China Program).
20. Id.
21. See NERSESIAN, supra note 3, at 291.
22. Environmental
Literacy
Council,
Hydroelectric
Power,
http://www.enviroliteracy.org/article.php/59.html (last visited June 1, 2009) [hereinafter
ELC, Hydroelectric Power]. The Environmental Literacy Council is an independent, nonprofit organization providing general environmental science information for educators and
the public. Environmental Literacy Council, About Us, http://www.enviroliteracy.org/
subcategory.php?id=1 (last visited June 1, 2009).
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refute the claim that these dams are environmentally friendly.23 Essentially, “man-made reservoirs convert carbon dioxide in the atmosphere into methane.”24 According to critics, in tropical areas of Brazil
where large dams produce more than ninety percent of electricity,
the dams’ reservoirs emit such a high amount of methane gas that
the dams’ contribution to climate change is even greater than that of
equivalent fossil fuel power plants.25 For example, estimates show
that the Balbina Dam in Brazil produces between twenty and forty
times more carbon dioxide than power plants using coal.26 According
to the estimates of Philip Fearnside of Brazil’s National Institute for
Research in the Amazon in Manaus, such high emission rates are
from carbon that is “tied up in trees and other plants [which is] released when the reservoir is initially flooded and the plants rot.”27 After the initial decay, plant parts then settle on the floor of the reservoir and continue to decompose, which results in an increase of dissolved methane because the plants are decomposing with no oxygen.28 When water passes through the turbine, this dissolved methane is released into the air.29 Fernando Ramos, lead scientist for
the National Space Research Institute (INPE) in Brazil, stated that
“ ‘[i]t’s like opening a bottle of soda. A large part of the methane is
dissolved in the water bubbles, and it’s released to the atmosphere.’ ”30
While great uncertainty exists as to how much methane hydroelectric dams actually emit into the atmosphere,31 INPE scientists estimate that large dams may be responsible for worldwide annual
emissions of 800 million tons of carbon dioxide, whereas the United
Kingdom’s total greenhouse gas emissions in 2006 was around 660
million tons.32

23. See Duncan Graham-Rowe, Hydroelectric Power’s Dirty Secret Revealed,
NEWSCIENTIST, Feb. 24, 2005, http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7046; Tim
Hirsch, Project Aims to Extract Dam Methane, BBC NEWS, May 10, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/6638705.stm.
24. Graham-Rowe, supra note 23.
25. Id.
26. International
Rivers,
Frequently
Asked
Questions
About
Dams,
http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/node/480 (last visited June 1, 2009) [hereinafter
Frequently Asked Questions About Dams].
27. Graham-Rowe, supra note 23.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Hirsch, supra note 23.
31. See id. Each dam may emit different levels of methane gas. Id. The amount of methane gas emitted depends on, among other things, the amount of vegetation in the water,
the water’s temperature, and the reservoir’s shape. Id.
32. Id. Although not within the scope of this Comment, it is relevant to note that the
INPE scientists have proposed that “with relatively simple technology, this unwanted byproduct of hydro-electric power generation could be turned into an extra source of clean,
renewable electricity.” See id. (providing a brief note on and a detailed chart regarding
such technology).
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2. River Flow and Affected Ecosystems
Freshwater ecosystems provide many things that humans depend on, such as “food and fiber, water purification,” and “fish
and wildlife.”33 But in order to provide these things, freshwater
ecosystems are dependent upon the “cycling of water and on
functioning ecological processes and species assemblages.”34 In
order to maintain the health of these ecosystems, the water must
maintain a particular level of both quality and quantity.35 Thousands of species and activities depend upon freshwater ecosystems.36 Specifically, approximately forty percent of fish are of a
freshwater species and approximately 200 new freshwater species are identified yearly.37 And, of the 10,000 freshwater species
that have already been identified, approximately 2,000 are already endangered, vulnerable, or extinct.38 Given the large number of species relying on these ecosystems and the number of
these species that are endangered and vulnerable, maintaining
the ecosystems is of grave importance.39
The most significant environmental impact of hydroelectric dams
is, arguably, the alteration of the affected river’s flow.40 When river
flows are altered, it is not merely the visible appearance of the river
that is changed. Rather, it is a cycle that has much deeper impacts—
even beyond the river itself.41
(a) Natural Flooding
While flood control is undoubtedly beneficial to some extent, especially for those who would otherwise lose their communities and
businesses, arguably “[t]he elimination of the benefits provided by

33. Karin M. Krchnak, The Nature Conservancy, “Greening” Hydropower: Integrating
Environmental Flow Considerations 2 (2006), http://www.nature.org/initiatives/freshwater/
files/hydropower_2006_krchnak_paper_final.pdf.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. International
Rivers,
Environmental
Impacts
of
Dams,
http://internationalrivers.org/en/node/1545 (last visited June 1, 2009) [hereinafter Environmental Impacts of Dams]. Note that this impact is caused by other types of large dams
as well. Id. Also note that hydroelectric dams impact groundwater and wetlands. See Krchnak, supra note 33, at 2. Other than general references, however, these issues are outside the scope of this Comment.
41. See infra Part III.B.2 (focusing on the harms to a river’s flow and surrounding
ecosystem caused by hydroelectric dam construction and use).
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natural flooding may be the single most ecologically damaging impact of a dam.”42
Biologists generally recognize dams as the most damaging of the
sources that contribute to the disappearance of riverine species.43 The
loss of natural flooding affects river and floodplain ecosystems overall. Such ecosystems “are closely adapted to a river’s flooding cycle.
The native plants and animals depend on its variations for reproduction, hatching, migration, and other important lifecycle stages. Annual floods deposit nutrients on the land, flush out backwater channels, and replenish wetlands.”44
(b) Ecosystem Fragmentation
Damming a river fragments the riverine ecosystem by isolating
the upstream and downstream ecosystems and cutting off species’
migration habits;45 this causes serious changes to species’ historical
spawning habits.46 For example, in the current construction of the
Brazilian Madeira River hydroelectric dams,47 catfish have become
“the main symbol of the controversy.”48 These fish have an intricate
2,000-mile migration to the “mouth of the Amazon,” and, according to
experts, the dams will disrupt this migration.49 River ecosystem
fragmentation has resulted in a serious reduction in watershed species.50 For example, in the Northwest United States, as a result of
hydroelectric dam construction (among other reasons, such as over42. PATRICK MCCULLY, SILENCED RIVERS: THE ECOLOGY AND POLITICS OF LARGE
DAMS 31 (2001).
43. Lori Pottinger, International Rivers, Environmental Impacts of Large Dams: African Examples (Oct. 1, 1996), http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/africa/environmentalimpacts-large-dams-african-examples.
44. Id.
45. MCCULLY, supra note 42, at 31; see also WHIPPLE, supra note 8, at 65. It should be
noted that certain technologies have been used on hydroelectric dams in order to alleviate
some fish migration problems. See WHIPPLE, supra note 8, at 66-67 (“[T]he dams on the Columbia [River] and many other rivers have fish ladders, which are quite efficient in allowing movement of adult fish migrating upstream in order to spawn. However, the problems
of moving the immature ‘fingerlings’ downstream after spawning have proved much more
difficult to handle.”).
46. See generally D.D. Dauble et al., Impacts of the Columbia River Hydroelectric System on Main-Stem Habitats of Fall Chinook Salmon, 23 N. AM. J. FISHERIES MGMT. 641
(2003) (describing the changes in the spawning habits and the resulting decrease in
anadromous fish run populations in the Columbia and Snake rivers as a result of hydroelectric dams).
47. See infra Part VI.C.
48. Larry Rohter, Both Sides Say Project Is Pivotal Issue for Brazil, N.Y. TIMES
ONLINE, June 11, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/11/world/americas/11amazon.html.
49. Id.
50. MCCULLY, supra note 42, at 31. It is noteworthy, however, that species isolation
may be beneficial for some species, because dams provide a reservoir that allows for the
creation of habitat for lake fish. Id. Additionally, the increase in the amount of cool water—released as a result of creation of the reservoir—may allow some fish to thrive that
could not have done so when the water was warm. Id.

2009]

HYDROELECTRIC DAMS

495

fishing) on the Columbia River, anadromous fish populations have
decreased from an average of 10 to 16 million fish per year at the beginning of the twentieth century to an annual run size of only
2.5 million.51
Currently, the exact global extent of river ecosystem fragmentation caused by dams has not been determined.52 However, Swedish
ecologists, Mats Dynesius and Christer Nilsson, from the University
of Umeå,
estimated the degree of damage to river systems in the US, Canada, Europe and the former USSR. . . . [and] found that fully 77 per
cent of the total water discharge of the 139 largest river systems in
these countries is ‘strongly or moderately affected by fragmentation of the river channels by dams and by water regulation resulting
from
reservoir
operation,
interbasin
diversion
and irrigation’.53

Dynesius and Nilsson also concluded that “ ‘[a]s a result of habitat
destruction and obstruction to organism dispersal,’ . . . ‘many riverine species may have become extinct over vast areas, whereas populations of others have become fragmented and run the risk of
future extinction.’ ”54
(c) Sediment Displacement
Sedimentary deposits, to both river channels and banks, are pertinent: “too much sediment can aggrade channels and cause flooding
problems, whereas erosion of sediment can degrade habitat.”55 While
natural sediment levels vary between regions of the world (and thus
sedimentation affects areas differently) according to the World
Commission on Dams, assuming that no controls are implemented to
control sedimentation, in the next twenty-five to fifty years, reservoir

51. Dauble et al., supra note 46, at 641 (“Although the exact amount of fish lost to hydropower development is uncertain, salmonid habitats in the main-stem Columbia and
Snake rivers have changed dramatically during the past 60 years. For example, many
areas where salmonids spawned are now a series of low-velocity impoundments, and access
to other habitats is blocked by impassable barriers.”). For a more recent example of a major
reduction in freshwater species resulting from dam construction, see infra notes 334-37
and accompanying text, which discuss a recent “mass killing” of fish during the initial construction phases of the Santo Antonio dam in Brazil.
52. MCCULLY, supra note 42, at 31; accord, e.g., Dauble et al., supra note 46, at 641.
53. MCCULLY, supra note 42, at 31.
54. Id.
55. MICHAEL COLLIER ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, CIRCULAR NO.1126, DAMS
AND RIVERS: A PRIMER ON THE DOWNSTREAM EFFECTS OF DAMS, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
3 (2d rev. ed. 2000).
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sedimentation will eliminate twenty-five percent of the world’s storage capacity for fresh water.56
In a river’s normal state, sediments allow natural replenishment
of the downstream ecosystems by moving sediments downstream and
depositing them along the riverbeds and river banks; this essentially
serves as a natural fertilizer.57 A dam, however, captures these natural sediments and prevents them from moving downstream, thus depriving the downstream portion of the river.58 When a river is deprived of normal sediment placement, the river seeks to nourish itself by eroding the river’s bank and downstream riverbed.59 This can
even undermine bridges and structures built along the riverbank.60
Within a decade of a dam’s initial operation, downstream riverbeds
may be eroded by several meters, and damage may even be felt hundreds of kilometers downstream of the dam.61
Sediment reduction also affects the fish and wildlife relying on the
natural sediment process.62 For example, because sediment reduction
causes the water to become clearer, many fish and wildlife species
will be at greater risk of danger because they are less camouflaged.63
A river’s loss of natural sediments also affects the upstream portion of the river.64 Just as the downstream portion of the river is deprived of these valuable sediments, a dam’s reservoir can be damaged by an accumulation and buildup of these same sediments.65 Because sediments and nutrients are trapped behind the dam, the lack
of water flow is then likely to cause growth and spread of algae and
other aquatic weeds.66 Further, due to lack of movement, water in the
reservoir becomes stagnant, resulting in loss of oxygen.67 Ultimately,
this cycle can reduce the number of organisms living in the reservoir.68 In extreme cases, sediment buildup can put additional pressure on the dam itself, which can actually weaken the dam.69

56. Moran, supra note 7, at 22-23 (noting that “the WCD predicts that most of the
global loss of fresh water storage capacity will occur in the developing countries as well as
those with higher sedimentation rates”).
57. Environmental Impacts of Dams, supra note 40.
58. Id; see, e.g., infra note 322 and accompanying text (describing study of the expected effects of Brazil’s Madeira River dam projects with regard to sedimentation).
59. Environmental Impacts of Dams, supra note 40.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Moran, supra note 7, at 23.
63. Id. at 24.
64. See id. at 23-24.
65. Id. at 22.
66. ELC, Hydroelectric Power, supra note 22.
67. Moran, supra note 7, at 23.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 22.
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Groundwater pollution may also result from sediment deprivation.70 Specifically, farmers downstream who rely on the water as
a source of fertilizer are then forced to use substitute types of
fertilizer, which may ultimately pollute both the river and the related groundwater.71
3. Cultural, Historical, and Health Concerns
The human effect is one of the most significant harms of hydroelectric dams.72 The initial construction itself results in mass numbers
of individuals losing their homes, villages, communities, and ways of
life.73 Consider the Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River in China, for example.74 It was anticipated that the rising waters of the expansive reservoir could submerge over 140 towns, 326 townships,
and 1,351 villages, causing over one million people to be moved from
the general area.75
The World Commission on Dams estimated that between forty
and eighty million people have been physically displaced,76 but this
may be a conservative estimate. The World Bank estimates that approximately four million people are displaced annually from “approximately 300 large dams (above 15m high) that on average enter construction phase annually.”77 This number, however, does not account
for those whose livelihoods are affected by dams.78 For example, a
city’s unemployment may ultimately rise as a result of dam construc70. Id.
71. Id.
72. While the social and economic impacts of hydroelectric dams are important and
relevant to a State’s construction decision, they are outside the scope of this Comment.
73. See Matthew Coon Come, Survival in the Context of Mega-Resource Development:
Experiences of the James Bay Crees and the First Nations of Canada, in IN THE WAY OF
DEVELOPMENT: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, LIFE PROJECTS AND GLOBALIZATION 153, 155 (Mario
Baser et al. eds., 2004). Matthew Come described the effects of development on indigenous
communities in Northern Canada in the early 1970s:
In 1972 I was a young student . . . , and I read in the newspaper one day about
Quebec’s ‘hydroelectric project of the century’. [sic] I looked at a map and saw
that my community’s lands at Mistissini were to be submerged because they
were going to use Lake Mistissini as a reservoir. It was then that our people
realized that the plans of Hydro-Quebec to dam and divert more than a dozen
rivers in our territory would spell an end to our way of life.
Id.; see also ELC, Hydroelectric Power, supra note 22.
74. See infra Part III.C.
75. DAI QING, THE RIVER DRAGON HAS COME!: THE THREE GORGES DAM AND THE FATE
OF CHINA’S YANGTZE RIVER AND ITS PEOPLE 41, 52 (John G. Thibodeau & Philip B. Williams eds., Yi Ming Trans., 1998).
76. THAYER SCUDDER, THE FUTURE OF LARGE DAMS: DEALING WITH SOCIAL,
ENVIRONMENTAL, INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL COSTS 22 (2005); WORLD COMM’N ON
DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING 104 (2000),
available at http://www.dams.org//docs/report/wcdreport.pdf.
77. SCUDDER, supra note 76, at 22.
78. Id.
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tion because farmers are displaced as a result of their land being
flooded for the creation of the reservoir.79
Even if river dwellers are not physically displaced by dam construction, they are still impacted. Where dam construction blocks
migration and ultimately causes complete or partial diminishment of
a species, river dwellers relying on those species also suffer.80 For example, in the case of the Madeira River construction in Brazil,81 fish
species likely to be negatively affected (which some claim could become extinct) serve as the main protein source of those living along
the Madeira and Amazon.82 Additionally, since these fish provide
economically for people living along the rivers,83 elimination of the
species in the area would, presumably, further contribute to the large
number of indigent people in the area.
Another problem is overreliance on dams as flood protection.84 Often times, this reliance may prove to be a “false sense of security”
during large floods, when dams are not sufficient to hold back all of
the water.85 Specifically, reliance has led people to increase development in floodplains, and thus during large floods the resulting damage may be even greater than it otherwise would have been without
the dam.86
C. Three Gorges Dam: Yangtze River, China
The Three Gorges Dam project on the Yangtze River in China demonstrates the difficulty of striking a balance between the benefits
and harms of hydroelectric dams. The dam was structurally completed in May 2006 and is the world’s largest reinforced concrete hydroelectric dam.87 In late 2008, the final generating unit was installed, and on March 3, 2009, the project announced that, like the
other twenty-five generating units, the final generating unit had suc-

79. Moran, supra note 7, at 7.
80. See, e.g., Glenn Switkes, The Americas Program, Brazilian Government Moves to
Dam Principal Amazon Tributary 2 (2007), http://americas.irc-online.org/pdf/reports/
0706amazon-eng.pdf.
81. Id.; see also infra Part VI.C.
82. Switkes, supra note 80, at 2. For a recent “mass killing” of these fish along the
Madeira River, see infra notes 334-37 and accompanying text.
83. Id.
84. See Institute for Ecological Health, supra note 18.
85. Id.
86. See Bob Schildgen, Unnatural Disasters, SIERRA MAG, May-June 1999, available
at http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/199905/floods.asp.
87. Three Gorges Dam Wall Completed, BBC NEWS, May 20, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5000092.stm. Proposals for dam construction on the
Yangtze River date back to around 1918, but such a project was not actually accepted until
1992 and not actually begun until 1994. See China Three Gorges Project, History,
http://www.ctgpc.com/history/history_a.php (last visited June 1, 2009).
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cessfully operated for its first 100 days.88 The completed reservoir
spans 401 square miles.89
Construction of the Three Gorges Dam has always been, and remains, controversial—especially between scientists who claim that
the dam will cause extreme environmental harm and the political
proponents within the Chinese government.90 The Chinese government supported the dam for two main reasons—energy generation
and flood control.91 Regarding energy generation, in comparison to
coal-fired power stations with electricity generation, the plant will
decrease carbon dioxide emissions by 100 million tons and will help
prevent acid rain and the greenhouse effect.92 And, with regard to
flood control, the Yangtze River is known to have devastating floods;
for example, a flood in 1998 affected 300 million people.93 Previous
estimates predicted that upon completion, the flood control standard
would be upgraded from preventing floods categorized as less than
10-year floods to preventing 100-year floods.94 Estimates show that
this upgrade will relieve approximately 15 million people and 1.5
million hectares of farmland from flooding.95
In addition to these main goals, the Chinese government intended
the dam to increase navigability, which would extend the travel
route into China’s mainland.96 The ultimate hope for this navigability

88. China Three Gorges Project, All 26 Generating Units in Smooth Operation for
First 100 Days, http://www.ctgpc.com/news/news1.php?NewsId=32399 (last visited June
1, 2009).
89. NASA Satellites Watch as China Constructs Giant Dam, supra note 10.
90. See generally Jim Yardley, Chinese Dam Projects Criticized for Their Human
Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/
19/world/asia/19dam.html.
91. Samuel Robert Fishleigh Allin, An Examination of China’s Three Gorges Dam
Project Based on the Framework Presented in the Report of the World Commission on
Dams 16-17 (Nov. 30, 2004) (unpublished Master’s thesis, Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and
State
University),
available
at
http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/
etd-12142004-125131/unrestricted/SAllin_010304.pdf. Chinese Government documents,
especially those released by the Ministry of Water Resources, commonly note
that overall ecosystem enhancement will occur because of the [Three Gorges
Dam]. This will include the establishment of new ecosystems supported by the
[Three Gorges Dam] reservoir and better, more controlled conditions in the
areas downstream of the dam. Based on the literature and findings of the
WCD, this statement should be questioned. There are a few recognized ecosystem benefits that occur from the construction of large dams, however the net
environmental effect is almost always negative.
Id. at 22-23.
92. China Three Gorges Project, Environment, http://www.ctgpc.com/environmental/
environmental_a.php (last visited June 1, 2009).
93. Allin, supra note 91, at 16 (citations omitted).
94. China Three Gorges Project, Biggest Flood Control Benefit in the World,
http://www.ctgpc.com/benefifs/benefifs_a.php (last visited June 1, 2009).
95. Id.
96. Allin, supra note 91, at 17.
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increase was to “cause the emergence of new markets, job creation,
and economic vitality.”97 Earlier estimates provided that when complete, as it now is, the annual one-way navigation capacity of the
Yangtze River at the dam would increase from ten million to fifty
million tons.98 Yet another goal of the Chinese Government was accessibility to fresh water.99 The dam was projected to increase fresh
water access for both agriculture and consumption purposes.100
While many economic benefits are (or at least are expected to be)
derived from construction and operation of the Three Gorges Dam,
the environmental concerns may arguably undermine these benefits.101 Currently, obvious problems caused by the dam include drastic
changes to the river’s water temperature, silt levels, and seasonal
fluctuations in the river’s flow.102 Additionally, significant amounts of
reservoir greenhouse gas emissions will result from vegetation
breakdown, silt, and other organics, which decompose at the bottom
of the reservoir.103 Thus, the alleged “clean energy” theory for the
Three Gorges Dam is undermined because of these reservoir greenhouse gas emissions.104 Furthermore, silting may eventually cause an
increase in flooding because of silt buildup in the dam’s reservoir.105
Even more extreme is that this silt buildup may “reduce the effectiveness of power generation schemes, while upstream siltation may
impact navigability.”106
The downstream portion of the river is also affected by this silt
buildup in the reservoir. This buildup results in less silt flowing
downstream, thus compromising the river’s ability to naturally replenish itself.107 Loss of nutrients then reduces “fertility” of the
agricultural lands downstream,108 and the “[d]isruption of the
natural distribution and timing of streamflow disrupt[s]
aquatic ecosystems.”109
After supporting the Three Gorges Dam project for over a decade,
on September 26, 2007, China’s Communist Party gave a firm warning that unless preventative measures were quickly taken, an environmental disaster was approaching for the areas surrounding the
97. Id.
98. China
Three
Gorges
Project,
Remarkable
Navigation
http://www.ctgpc.com/benefifs/benefifs_a_3.php (last visited June 1, 2009).
99. Allin, supra note 91, at 17.
100. Id.
101. NERSESIAN, supra note 3, at 301.
102. Allin, supra note 91, at 20.
103. Id. at 19.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 20.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 20-21.
108. Id. at 20.
109. Id.

Benefit,
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dam and that the same areas were paying a serious and possibly
catastrophic environmental cost.110 Further, Wang Xiaofeng, the director of the administrative office that built the dam, noted that “it
was time to face up to the environmental consequences of a project
hailed as an achievement to rival the Great Wall.”111 Specifically,
Xiaofeng stated: “ ‘We absolutely cannot relax our guard against ecological and environmental security problems sparked by the Three
Gorges project. We cannot win passing economic prosperity at the
cost of the environment.’ ”112
Overall, while there are nonenvironmental benefits resulting from
the Three Gorges Dam and hydroelectric dams in general, there are
many negative environmental impacts, which a State should thoroughly analyze when deciding whether to construct such a dam. The
previous discussion of the Three Gorges Dam demonstrates the seriousness of dams’ potential environmental harm and shows one
State’s realization that further analysis of the benefits and harms
was necessary: “It was hailed as one of the engineering feats of the
20th century. Now the Three Gorges Dam across China’s mighty
Yangtze River threatens to become an environmental catastrophe.”113
IV. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Beyond the actual environmental impacts on a State, an additional concern is that dam construction may also cause harm to the other
States that have rights to the same transboundary watercourse.
Thus, the focus of this Comment now turns to the relevant sources of
international environmental law in an attempt to address States’ legal duties in the construction and use of hydroelectric dams.
International environmental law, while not as well established or
readily enforceable as many States’ domestic law, essentially operates through customary international law and treaties.114 Customary
110. Jane Macartney, Three Gorges Dam Is a Disaster in the Making, China Admits,
TIMES
ONLINE,
Sept.
27,
2007,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/
world/article2537279.ece.
111. Id.
112. Id. For a further look at the events surrounding these comments by the Chinese
government, see generally Yardley, supra note 90, and Jim Yardley, China Says Three
Gorges Dam Is Not Responsible for Landslides, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/world/asia/28gorges.html.
113. Macartney, supra note 110.
114. Customary International Law consists of principles that have become standard either in a particular region or internationally; such practices are “undertaken out of a sense
of legal obligation (the opinio juris).” Joseph W. Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments for
Managing Internationally-Shared Water Resources: Restricted Sovereignty vs. Community
of Property, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 27, 33 (1994) (citation omitted). “Practices that
crystallize as customary international law can include multilateral decisions reflected in
votes in international assemblies, decisions by international courts or international arbitrators, or apparently unilateral actions of states. Even treaties or other international
agreements can express customary rules of international law.” Id. at 34 (citations omitted).
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international law is binding on all States, and a particular treaty is
binding on those States that have signed on.115
For clarity purposes, this Section is organized by first detailing
those broad themes of international environmental law that, among
many other issues, are relevant to transboundary watercourses.
Next, this Section will present several sources of international environmental law specifically applicable to transboundary watercourses
and thus applicable to hydroelectric dam construction and use on
such waters. Finally, this Section will focus on recurring themes presented in these sources, highlight strengths and weaknesses, and
discuss the enforceability of these sources.
A. Broad Sources of International Environmental Law
1. Relevant Sources
Both the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment (“Stockholm Declaration”),116 adopted in 1972,
and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (“Rio Declaration”),117 adopted in 1992, present general principles of international law that are applicable to, among other issues, transboundary
watercourses and hydroelectric dams.118 While neither the Stockholm
Declaration119 nor the Rio Declaration were originally binding,120
Customary international law, however, is not sufficient to deal with all global environmental problems; “even on the most optimistic view, customary international law can hardly be
said to have sufficient scope or content to prevent damage and provide sufficient sanctions
to be directed against the perpetrators of the damage when it occurs.” INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 14 (Anthony D’Amato & Kirsten Engel eds., 1996).
115. See generally INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 114,
at 109.
116. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June
5-16, 1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (June 16, 1972), revised by U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Corr.1 (1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]. The Stockholm Declaration was adopted after the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
met in Stockholm from June 5 through June 16, 1972. Id. The Conference adopted this declaration after it “considered the need for a co[m]mon outlook and for common principles to
inspire and guide the peoples of the world in the preservation and enhancement of the human environment.” Id.
117. Twenty years after the Stockholm Declaration was created, the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development was adopted following the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil from June 3 through June 14,
1992. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz.,
June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1 (June 13,1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) [hereinafter Rio
Declaration]. Endorsed by 172 nations, the declaration reaffirms the Stockholm Declaration and builds on it, “[w]ith the goal of establishing a new and equitable global partnership through the creation of new levels of cooperation among States.” Id.
118. See id.; see also Stockholm Declaration, supra note 116.
119. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 116 (describing itself as “common principles to inspire and guide the peoples of the world in the preservation and enhancement of
the human environment,” as opposed to requiring such actions); see also INTERNATIONAL
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even on those States that signed on to the Declarations, each offers
much to the field of international environmental law.121 The Stockholm Declaration, in particular, has proven especially influential in
the field of international environmental law,122 as it was the first
“widely accepted effort to set forth basic concepts and principles,” and
certain Stockholm principles are indeed considered customary international law.123 At present, the Rio Declaration has not received such
widespread acceptance; however, certain Rio principles are accepted
as customary international law and are therefore binding.124
2. Relevant Themes
(a) Development and Resource Exploitation
The well-established Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration,125
which is widely considered customary international law,126 provides
that States have “the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies.”127 Important, howev-

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 114, at 17 (“The view prevailed that the
[Stockholm] Declaration should merely outline ‘broad goals and objectives . . . .’ ”).
120. JOHN O’BRIEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 555-56 (2001); see also Rio Declaration, supra
note 117 (providing that its “goal” was to “establish[] a new and equitable global partnership through the creation of new levels of cooperation among States,” but not mentioning
any requirement of such cooperation).
121. See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 46466 (3d ed. 2007).
122. See Said Mahmoudi, Introduction to CTR. FOR OCEANS LAW & POLICY, THE
STOCKHOLM DECLARATION AND LAW OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 3, 3-4 (Myron H. Nordquist et al., eds. 2003) (“The Stockholm Conference and the declaration that the participating States adopted at the end of the conference are generally considered as the starting
point for what constitutes today the modern international law and policy for the environment.”); id. at 3 (“The significance of the Stockholm Declaration lies in the fact that despite
all the obstacles and lack of genuine political will on the part of a great number of States,
it succeeded in laying down a number of general principles that since then have constituted a framework and a source of reference whenever a step has been taken for the international protection of the environment.”); id. at 4 (“Repeated references to the Stockholm
Declaration in almost all major international environmental agreements show that the
Declaration is indeed a milestone and the starting point for the body of laws and policies
that today apply to the protection of the environment at the international level.”).
123. Alexandre Kiss, The Destiny of the Principles of the Stockholm Declaration, in THE
STOCKHOLM DECLARATION AND LAW OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 122, at 53,
59 (noting that Stockholm Principles 1 and 21 “have been developed into customary rules”).
124. Id.; see, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 137-39.
125. The Rio Declaration adopted this same concept in Rio Principle 2. See Rio Declaration, supra note 117, princ. 2. The only change made, in comparison to Stockholm Principle 21, was the addition of the words “and developmental” to then read, in relevant part,
“the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental
and developmental policies.” Id. (emphasis added). This was added presumably because of
the overall theme of development focused on by the Conference.
126. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 121, at 465.
127. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 116, princ. 21; see also INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 114, at 19.
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er, is that this right to exploit comes with a major exception.128 Principle 21 requires that States “ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”129 Principle 14 of the Stockholm Declaration provides guidance by stating
that to “reconcil[e] any conflict between the needs of development
and the need to protect and improve the environment,”130 States must
use the “essential tool” of “[r]ational planning.”131 According to
Stockholm Principle 13, to “ensure that development is compatible
with the need to protect and improve the human environment for the
benefit of [a State’s] population,” “States should adopt an integrated
and coordinated approach to [its] development planning.”132
The Corfu Channel133 case also demonstrates the general notion
that States are not entitled to use their territories in ways that will
ultimately harm other States.134 Specifically, the case provides that
States may not use their territory in ways that they know will damage other States.135 If States do act with such knowledge, they must
compensate the harmed State for the damage caused.136
(b) Environmental Preservation
The Precautionary Principle or Approach also receives widespread
usage in international law, and it may be considered international
environmental law.137 Since at least the 1960s, the Precautionary
Principle has been used in international issues, but at least since the
1980s, it has been frequently used in international environmental
law—through both multilateral and bilateral treaties.138 While the
usage of the Precautionary Approach as an international rule has not
been without challenge, “[a]t a minimum . . . there is sufficient evidence of state practice to justify the conclusion that the principle, as
elaborated in the Rio Declaration, reflects a broadly accepted basis

128. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 116, princ. 21.
129. Id.
130. Presumably, this language addresses the environment of a State’s own territory
as well as the territory of other States.
131. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 116, princ. 14.
132. Id. princ. 13.
133. The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
134. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 114, at 13.
135. Id.
136. Id. Note that few international cases have addressed the issue of damages owed to
a State that has been harmed. Id. at 20.
137. Id. at 21.
138. Id. at 20-21; see also Int’l Law Ass’n (ILA), Berlin Conference: Water Resources
Law,
art.
23
cmt.
(2004)
[hereinafter
Berlin
Rules],
available
at
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/intldocs/ILA_Berlin_Rules-2004.pdf (“[T]he
precautionary principle appears in almost all international environmental instruments
adopted since 1990.”).
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for international action.”139 In the Rio Declaration, the inclusion of a
precautionary approach was “unanimously endorsed.”140
Quite generally, the Precautionary Principle is the concept that
States have a duty to protect the environment by considering the effects that development will cause.141 The Precautionary Principle,
however, does not serve to completely halt and forbid all action that
will harm the environment.142 Although the Precautionary Principle
“indeed may impose a ‘no-go’ or a ‘go-slow’ on certain directions of innovation and scientific progress . . . , [it] is not based on ‘zero risks’
but aims to achieve lower or more acceptable risks or hazards.” 143
Many people fear that such a precautionary approach “may stifle
innovation or hamper scientific progress.”144 In reality, however, an
increase in the use of the Precautionary Principle “can help stimulate
both innovation and science, replacing [outdated] technologies . . .
with the clean technologies and systems science of a new industrial
revolution.”145 The result is likely to be an effective balance between
innovation and the associated harm.146
Further, Rio Principle 15 also states that “[w]here there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation.”147 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognized this duty in the 1997

139. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 114, at 22. For a
critique of whether the Precautionary Principle is indeed customary international law, see
Jutta Brunnée, The Stockholm Declaration and the Structure and Processes of International Environmental Law, in THE STOCKHOLM DECLARATION AND LAW OF THE MARINE
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 122, at 67, 77, which notes that “doubts linger” as to whether
the Precautionary Principle is truly customary international law and noting that while “an
increasing number of observers conclude that the principle is binding custom,” some
are skeptical and some states claim that there is no legally binding effect to the Precautionary Principle.
140. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 114, at 21.
141. See Rio Declaration, supra note 117, princ. 15.
142. See id.
143. WORLD COMM’N ON THE ETHICS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND TECH., THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 16 (2005), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/
001395/139578e.pdf. The precautionary approach differs from the traditional view of
“scientific findings” in that the traditional view may have ultimately resulted in the abandonment of a project where it was not certain that the project would not result in environmental harm. See INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 114, at 21.
144. WORLD COMM’N ON THE ETHICS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND TECH., supra note
143, at 15.
145. Id. at 15-16.
146. See id. (“While the [Precautionary Principle] indeed may impose a ‘no-go’ or
a ‘go-slow’ on certain directions of innovation and scientific progress, the [Precautionary
Principle] at the same time acts as a stimulant for other innovations and clean technological progress.”).
147. Rio Declaration, supra note 117, princ. 15.
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GabĀíkovo-Nagymaros Project Case.148 Though the ICJ shows great
respect for the environment,149 at the same time it held that a State
must fulfill its obligations where there is no proof that such activity
will cause significant harm.150
The Precautionary Principle does take into consideration the different economic circumstances of States, and thus its application is
not static.151 Specifically, Rio Principle 15152 provides that “[i]n order
to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States according to their capabilities.”153 This attempts to prevent exploitation of the developing States because they
are not held to the same standards as thriving developed States.154
The Principle of Sustainable Development155 is also an important
international environmental law concept.156 Generally, this principle
stands for the proposition that States have an obligation to develop
in a way so as to preserve resources for future generations.157 Specifically, Rio Principle 3 provides that “[t]he right to development must
be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental
needs of present and future generations.”158 Rio Principle 4 details
how to fulfill this obligation by stating that “to achieve sustainable
development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral
part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation

148. Case Concerning the GabĀíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J.
7, 42 (Sept. 25).
149. Id. at 41 (emphasizing “the great significance that [the ICJ] attaches to respect for
the environment, not only for States but also for the whole of mankind”).
150. See id. at 42 (noting that to fulfill its obligations, Hungary must have “at least
proven that a real, ‘grave’ and ‘imminent’ ‘peril’ existed . . . and that the measures taken by
Hungary were the only possible response to it”).
151. See Rio Declaration, supra note 117, princ. 15.
152. Although the themes of the Rio Declaration are quite similar to the themes previously addressed by the Stockholm Declaration, the Stockholm Declaration did not address the Precautionary Principle.
153. Rio Declaration, supra note 117, princ. 15.
154. While many sources of international environmental law account for the inability
of developing countries to comply with certain standards to the same extent of developed
countries, these are not within the scope of this Comment.
155. Rio Declaration, supra note 117, princ. 4.
156. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 121, at 200 (noting that since the Rio Declaration,
the Principle of Sustainable Development “has received nearly universal acceptance . . .
among every sector of international society” and that the concept has been included in
many international environmental declarations and treaties).
157. See id.
158. Rio Declaration, supra note 117, princ. 3.
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from it.”159 This principle does not prevent development; rather it requires that each State approach development in a certain way.160
Conjunctively, the Precautionary Principle and Principle of Sustainable Development show that States have an obligation to use environmental effects as a consideration, not as a determinative factor,
in whether to move forward with construction and development
projects (including hydroelectric dam projects, among others). Where
a State has knowledge that extreme environmental consequences are
certain to result from a considered development, then both principles
would likely say to not move forward.
Yet, where such environmental consequences are not certain to
result—even if only because the scientific evidence is not determinative or complete—the Precautionary Principle advises to continue but
at a slower, more careful pace. This slowed continuation would also
be in conformance with the Principle of Sustainable Development because moving at a slower rate would contribute to preservation of environmental resources for future generations. Because of this relationship, when a State formulates its development approach
in compliance with the Precautionary Principle, it is much more likely to also comply with the requirements of the Principle of Sustainable Development.161
Neither the Precautionary Principle nor the Principle of Sustainable Development gives mention to territorial boundaries.162 Thus,
arguably, the two principles obligate a State to consider the effect of
projects generally, including the impacts on other States, as opposed
to only the impact on its own current environment.163 Likewise, neither the Precautionary Principle nor the Principle of Sustainable Development applies solely to one resource or issue within the context
of international environmental law,164 and thus both principles are
applicable to a State’s construction and use of hydroelectric dams.

159. Id. princ. 4. The Rio Declaration also recognized that developing and developed
countries should not be held to the same standards, stating that “[t]he developed countries
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable
development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of
the technologies and financial resources they command.” Id. princ. 7.
160. See id. princ. 3.
161. Another view of the relationship between these principles is that the Principle of
Sustainable Development is a balance between the well-established Right to Develop and
the Precautionary Principle. Brian Trevor Hodges, Where the Grass Is Always Greener:
Foreign Investor Actions Against Environmental Regulations Under NAFTA’s Chapter 11,
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, 14 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 367, 393-94 (2002).
162. See, e.g., Rio Declaration, supra note 117, princs. 3, 4, 15.
163. See generally id.
164. See id. princs. 3, 15.
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(c) States’ Duty to Cooperate
General sources of international environmental law also provide
that States have a duty to cooperate with each other; such cooperation is paramount to the adherence to other broad themes of international environmental law.165 This duty is considered customary international law.166 Principle 25 of the Rio Declaration provides a clear
and concise statement of this duty. Specifically, the principle provides that “[p]eace, development and environmental protection are
interdependent and indivisible.”167 Without peace between States,
there can be no successful movement toward environmental preservation; peace itself cannot result unless States are willing to cooperate. For example, Stockholm Principle 24 provides that
“[i]nternational matters concerning the protection and improvement
of the environment should be handled in a co-operative spirit by all
countries, big or small, on an equal footing.”168
Rio Principle 12 further provides that States should make all efforts to achieve international consensus for environmental concerns
by stating that “[u]nilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be
avoided. Environmental measures addressing transboundary or
global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on
an international consensus.”169 Less abstract, and more direct, is
Stockholm Principle 24, which stresses the duty of governments to
cooperate “through multilateral or bilateral arrangements, or other
appropriate means” for the purpose of controlling, reducing, or otherwise eliminating adverse environmental effects.170
In 1957, even before the Stockholm Declaration set forth this
principle, the Lake Lanoux Arbitration stressed notice.171 The panel
in Lake Lanoux “held that as a matter of customary international
law, a State that is engaging in behavior likely to significantly im165. See, e.g., id. princ. 25; see also Kiss, supra note 123, at 55 (noting that the Stockholm Declaration’s philosophy is expressed in large part in Principles 24 and 25, “inviting
States to cooperate in international matters concerning the protection and improvement of
the environment”).
166. See PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 461
(2d. ed. 2003).
167. Rio Declaration, supra note 117, princ. 25. Likewise, Rio Principle 26 holds that
“environmental disputes” should be handled “peacefully and by appropriate means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.” Id. princ. 26.
168. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 116, princ. 24 (emphasis added).
169. Rio Declaration, supra note 117, princ. 12. Rio Principle 12 further ties in the
Principle of Sustainable Development by stating the following: “States should cooperate to
promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to economic
growth and sustainable development in all countries, to better address the problems of environmental degradation.” Id.
170. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 116, princ. 24.
171. See generally Lake Lanoux Arbitration, 12 INT’L ARB. AWARDS 281, 315-16 (1957).
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pact the environment of another State is obliged to involve the affected State in discussions regarding these activities.”172
B. Sources of Transboundary Water Law
Sources of international law specifically addressing transboundary watercourses did not appear until approximately the 1950s.173
Prior to that, some sources did exist, such as nongovernmental resolutions, and sources specific to particular regions had not yet received international application.174 Multiple theories addressing the
relationship between riparian States with regard to transboundary
water rights have prevailed, depending on the particular time period.175 However, after a brief overview of the relevant sources of law,
this Section will focus primarily on the equitable utilization theory,
as it has become the “cornerstone” of international water law. The
available sources of international law, at least in part, adhere to
this theory.176
1. Relevant Sources
The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International
Rivers were adopted by the International Law Association (ILA) in
1967 after the ILA’s fifty-second conference, which was held in Helsinki, Finland in 1966.177 While these rules provide valuable information specifically applicable to international rivers, one major downfall
172. Hodges, supra note 161, at 393-94 (citation omitted).
173. Surya P. Subedi, Regulation of Shared Water Resources in International Law: The
Challenge of Balancing Competing Demands, in INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES LAW FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY: THE CASE OF THE RIVER GANGES BASIN 7, 8 (Surya P. Subedi ed., 2005).
174. Id. at 8-9.
175. See id. at 9.
176. See, e.g., Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International
Watercourses (1997) [hereinafter UN Convention], available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/
texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf (adopted by General Assembly Resolution Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, G.A.
Res. 51/229, art. 5, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 99th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/229 (May
21, 1997)).
177. Int’l Law Ass’n [ILA], Fifty-Second Conference, Helsinki Fin., Aug. 14-20, 1966,
The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers (Aug. 1966) [hereinafter Helsinki Rules], available at http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/
intldocs/helsinki_rules.html. After the Helsinki Rules were adopted in 1966, the ILA then
drafted multiple sets of rules to different water-related activities that were not specifically
addressed in the Helsinki Rules. Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Berlin Rules on Water Resources: The New Paradigm for International Water Law, in WORLD ENVIRONMENTAL AND
WATER RESOURCES CONGRESS 2006: EXAMINING THE CONFLUENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
AND WATER CONCERNS (American Society of Civil Engineers CD-ROM) (Randall Graham
ed., 2006) [hereinafter Dellapenna, The Berlin Rules], available at http://www.ualg.pt/
5cigpa/comunicacoes/Berlin Rules Summary.doc. These included: “flood control (1972), pollution (1972, 1982), navigability (1974), the protection of water installations during armed
conflicts (1976), joint administration (1976, 1986), flowage regulation (1980), general environmental management concerns (1980), groundwater (1986), cross-media pollution (1996),
and remedies (1996).” Id. at 4.
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is that these rules were not endorsed by the United Nations—the
ILA is a nongovernmental body that is not affiliated with the UN.178
Also important is that while the Helsinki Rules are relevant to the
issue of hydroelectric dams, they were not created as a multilateral
treaty, and thus the rules are not binding on any States.179
In 1997, the International Law Commission (ILC) of the United
Nations incorporated themes from the Helsinki Rules into its Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International
Watercourses.180 The UN Convention was approved by 103 States at
the Convention, but has still not come into force.181 Article 36 of the
UN Convention requires that thirty-five States ratify, accept, approve, or accede, and when the thirty-fifth instrument does this, the
UN Convention will come into force.182 As of May 2009, only sixteen
States had become signatories and seventeen states had ratified, accepted, approved, or acceded.183 While the allotted time for ratification expired in May 2000, some States that did accede did so after
the May 2000 deadline;184 States are thus still presumably permitted
to accede.185 Therefore, the UN Convention may at some point come
into force.186
Before the UN Convention’s adoption in 1997, “the international
community did not have at its disposal a set of written rules and
principles endorsed by a political arena. Up until this time, the Helsinki Rules . . . were the only set of written rules to be referred to,”187
178. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, The UN Convention on International Watercourses:
Prospects
for
an
Unfinished
Agenda
for
Co-Management,
http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/maksoud/water98/present7.htm#Chazournes (last visited
June 1, 2009). Although not affiliated with the United Nations, the ILA is well known for
“the articulation of cogent and compelling statements of the customary international law
relating to fresh water resources.” Berlin Rules, supra note 138, at 2 (“Working over a span
of nearly 50 years, the Association has produced a series of rules addressing various topics
relating to the overall field of international water law.”).
179. See generally Helsinki Rules, supra note 177.
180. UN Convention, supra note 176.
181. STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES: NONNAVIGATIONAL USES 315 (2001); Press Release, United Nations, General Assembly Adopts
Convention on Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, GA/9248
(May 21, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1997/19970521.ga9248.html.
182. UN Convention, supra note 176, art. 36.
183. United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Status as of 13 May 2009, Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses,
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume II/
Chapter XXVII/XXVII-12.en.pdf (last visited June 1, 2009) [hereinafter Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General]. Ratifying, accepting, acceding, and approving
States include: Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Namibia, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, South Africa, Sweden, Syrian Arab
Republic, Tunisia, and Uzbekistan. Id.
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. See id; see also MCCAFFREY, supra note 181, at 315.
187. de Chazournes, supra note 178.
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and it was debatable as to whether the Helsinki Rules actually “constituted customary law.”188 Note, however, that the Helsinki Rules
seem to, overall, be considered customary international law.189 In
1997, the very same year in which the UN Convention was adopted,
the International Court of Justice in the GabĀíkovo-Nagymoros
Project Case190 referred to the Convention “as expressing, at least in
part, contemporary customary international law governing internationally shared waters.”191 Even though the UN Convention has not
been ratified, one argument is that “the success of the Convention
does not depend on whether it enters into force. Its influence is more
likely to derive from its status as the most authoritative statement of
general principles and rules governing the non-navigational uses of
international watercourses.”192 Further, the UN Convention is likely
to “remain highly influential and persuasive as a statement of current customary and general international law on watercourses as it
is the culmination of over 20 years of in-depth research by the International Law Commission into the state of international watercourse
law and practice.”193
Recognition is also due to the Berlin Rules, the ILA’s 2004 revision of the Helsinki Rules.194 Arguably, “[t]he Berlin Rules set forth a
clear, cogent, and coherent summary of the relevant customary international law, incorporating the experience of the nearly four decades since the Helsinki Rules were adopted.”195
There are a couple of important differences in the scope of the
Berlin Rules in comparison to both the Helsinki Rules and the UN
Convention. One significant difference is that the Berlin Rules do not
188. Id. Widely accepted, however, is the claim that the Helsinki Rules are customary
international law. See, e.g., Dellapenna, The Berlin Rules, supra note 177, at 1 (arguing
that “[t]he Helsinki Rules quickly came to be seen as the authoritative summary of the customary international law on transboundary or internationally shared waters”). But see Lisa M. Jacobs, Sharing the Gifts of the Nile: Establishment of a Legal Régime for Nile Waters Management, 7 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 95, 101 (1993) (“The Helsinki Rules are not
an international convention. Nor are they a treaty, since they do not represent particular
states’ agreement among themselves to the principles expressed. The Helsinki Rules are
not customary law. Insufficient state practice exists to show the Rules’ widespread acceptance, and no evidence indicates that states feel bound to follow these Rules.”).
189. Joseph W. Dellapenna, International Law’s Lessons for the Law of the Lakes, 40 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 747, 762 (2007).
190. See Case Concerning the GabĀíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997
I.C.J. 7, 42 (Sept. 25).
191. Berlin Rules, supra note 138, at 3.
192. Stephen McCaffrey, The Contribution of the UN Convention on the Law of the
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 1 INT’L J. GLOBAL ENVTL. ISSUES
250, 250 (2001).
193. Owen McIntyre, The Role of Customary Rules and Principles of International Environmental Law in the Protection of Shared International Freshwater Resources, 46 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 157, 160 n.2 (2006).
194. See generally Berlin Rules, supra note 138.
195. Dellapenna, The Berlin Rules, supra note 177, at 6.
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solely focus on international waters.196 Instead, their focus includes
national waters “to the extent that customary international law
speaks to those waters.”197 Likewise, the Berlin Rules focus on
ground waters in addition to surface waters.198 Rapporteur for the
Berlin Rules, Joseph W. Dellapenna, stated in reference to these
rules that the inclusion of these matters within this single set of
rules allows
a lawyer, a jurist, a water manager, a water policy maker, or anyone else concerned by the rules of customary international [law]
pertaining to water [to], for the first time, find all the relevant
rules in one place, with attention to the interrelationships of the
rules as well as to their clear statement.199

The next subsection will emphasize discrepancies between the
Helsinki Rules, the UN Convention, and the Berlin Rules. Additionally, this Section will occasionally offer the author’s opinion regarding the language and importance of the contents of each of
these sources.
2. Relevant Themes
(a) Equitable Utilization
Currently, the theory of equitable utilization is at the “cornerstone” of international law regarding transboundary watercourses,200
and “[t]here is little contention that equitable utilisation is a wellestablished principle of customary international water law.”201
Equitable utilization202 can be viewed as an integration and compromise between two previous theories, the doctrine of absolute sovereignty and the doctrine of territorial integrity.203 Briefly, the doctrine of absolute sovereignty would allow an upper riparian State to
do as it wishes with the transboundary watercourse flowing through
its country regardless of the harm caused to the lower riparian

196. See id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 5-6.
199. Id. at 6-7.
200. Subedi, supra note 173, at 9.
201. Simon Nicholson, Water Scarcity, Conflict, and International Water Law: An Examination of the Regime Established by the UN Convention on International Watercourses,
5 N.Z. J. ENVTL. L. 91, 113 (2001).
202. “Equitability has been understood . . . to mean not division into equal portions,
but the equality of right to use the water for beneficial purposes.” Sharif S. Elmusa, Harmonizing Equitable Utilization and Significant Harm: Comments on the 1997 ILC Convention, Conference on “Water, Dispute Prevention and Development: South Perspectives,”
Presented at the Center for the Global South, American Univ. (Oct. 12-13, 1998),
http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/maksoud/water98/present7.htm#El-Musa.
203. See Dellapenna, The Berlin Rules, supra note 177, at 3.
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State.204 Conversely, the doctrine of territorial integrity may be used
by a lower riparian State to claim that it has a right to a “fair share”
of the water within the transboundary watercourse to “meet its existing and potential use.”205
The Helsinki Rules “crystallized and codified” the well-established
use of equitable utilization, albeit by using slightly different phraseology.206 Specifically, Article IV of the Helsinki Rules states that
“[e]ach basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable
and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin.”207
The UN Convention addresses equitable utilization in Articles 5
and 6.208 Importantly, notice that compared to the Helsinki Rules,
the UN Convention’s language is substantially longer and includes a
new focus. In particular, Article 5.2 includes for the first time (other
than individual treaties created between States) the idea of participation in achieving equitable and reasonable use:
1. Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an
international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner.
In particular, an international watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal
and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, taking
into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned,
consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse.
2. Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development
and protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and
reasonable manner. Such participation includes both the right to
utilize the watercourse and the duty to cooperate in the protection
and development thereof, as provided in the present Convention.209

Both the Helsinki Rules Article V and the UN Convention Article
6 provide ways to determine what is meant by equitable and reasonable use.210 Each of these sections includes a list of factors and provides that States must consider all relevant sources equally and “on
the basis of the whole.”211 While this flexibility is beneficial in the
sense that it leaves room to account for States’ particular circumstances and the uniqueness of particular regions and watercourses, it
may, for practical purposes, prove to be quite a complication. In practice, an analyst applying these factors may find this flexibility burdensome and lacking of sufficient guidance to determine whether a
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.; see also Subedi, supra note 173, at 9.
Subedi, supra note 173, at 9 (citation omitted).
Dellapenna, The Berlin Rules, supra note 177, at 3.
Helsinki Rules, supra note 177, art. IV (emphasis added).
UN Convention, supra note 176, arts. 5, 6.
Id. art. 5.
UN Convention, supra note 176, art. 6; Helsinki Rules, supra note 177, art. V.
UN Convention, supra note 176, art. 6; Helsinki Rules, supra note 177, art. V.
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use, such as hydroelectric dam construction, is actually an equitable
and reasonable use of a particular transboundary watercourse.212 Article 9 offers some help to analysts through its requirement that
States provide each other, on a regular basis, with relevant information.213 This requirement at least ensures that States have current,
relevant information on hand when making a determination.214
Recognizing the necessity for overall protection of the watercourse, Article 8 provides that “[w]atercourse States shall cooperate
on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in order to attain optimal utilization and adequate
protection of an international watercourse.”215 Arguably, the use of
the word “optimal” combined with the specification of “watercourse”
makes clear that an equitable and reasonable use is based on what is
equitable and reasonable for the watercourse as a whole rather than
simply a State’s equitable and reasonable use of that portion of the
watercourse flowing through its territory.
(i) UN Convention Article 5 and General Principles of International Environmental Law
Article 5 of the UN Convention can be viewed as incorporating
several important customary international law principles. Similar to
Stockholm Principle 21, a State is permitted to use transboundary
watercourses within its territories, but is precluded from doing so in
a way that harms another State.216
Additionally, “to be equitable and reasonable, the use must also be
consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse.”217 This can
be viewed as representing the broad themes of both the Precautionary Principle and Principle of Sustainable Development. Specifically, in order to protect the watercourse, a precautionary approach will
be necessary. For example, a State would not know for certain that it
is adhering to this protection requirement unless it moves more slowly in order to further investigate the effects of the dam, thereby adhering to a precautionary approach. Further, by taking such a precautionary approach, the State is much more likely to be in compliance with the overall Principle of Sustainable Development, as
such protection will preserve the watercourse for future generations.

212. Elmusa, supra note 202 (claiming that such an analyst will face difficulties “for
two reasons: one is that individual factors lack specificity as to meaning and, the second, is
that multiplicity of the factors and lack of assigning weights to each diminish their value
as a practical tool”).
213. McCaffrey, supra note 192, at 253.
214. Id.
215. UN Convention, supra note 176, art. 8 (emphasis added).
216. See id. art. 5.
217. McCaffrey, supra note 192, at 253.
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(b) No Significant Harm
It is well established in international law and specifically set forth
in Stockholm Principle 21 (and Rio Principle 2) that States may not
exploit their own resources to such a point so as to cause damage to
other States.218 This concept is included in the doctrine of no significant harm.219 While the Helsinki Rules principally focused on equitable utilization with no focus on the idea of no significant harm, the
UN Convention focuses on both.220 The concept of no significant harm
is codified in Article 7 of the UN Convention:
1. Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse States.
2. Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse State, the States whose use causes such harm shall, in
the absence of agreement to such use, take all appropriate measures, having due regard for the provisions of articles 5 and 6, in
consultation with the affected State, to eliminate or mitigate
such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the question
of compensation.221

(c) Competing Doctrines Within the UN Convention?: Equitable
Utilization Versus No Significant Harm
A major difficulty with the UN Convention is the “clash” between
equitable utilization (Article 5) and no significant harm (Article 7).222
This clash resulted in debate both during and after drafting regarding whether equitable utilization or no significant harm holds precedence.223 This determination is crucial because, on one hand, if
“equitable utilization” is deemed to take precedence, then so long as
an upstream riparian State’s actions are equitable and reasonable,
significant harm may eventually still be caused to the downstream
riparian State.224 On the other hand, if “no significant harm” is
deemed to take precedence, then an upstream riparian State is not
permitted to even an equitable and reasonable use of the transboundary watercourse, if that will cause significant harm to the downstream riparian State.225 For these reasons, upstream riparian States

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 116, princ. 21.
See UN Convention, supra note 176, art. 7.
See id. arts. 5, 7.
Id. art. 7.
Nicholson, supra note 201, at 116-17.
Id.
Id. at 117.
Id.
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are in favor of the equitable utilization principle and downstream riparian owners are in favor of the no significant harm principle.226
Negotiations during drafting eventually resulted in a compromise;
however, “the balance reached between articles 5 and 7 can best be
described as ‘tantalisingly obscure.’ ”227 Unfortunately, the adopted
draft, even after extensive negotiations, still presents problems between whether equitable utilization or no significant harm prevails.228
Although some may view the issue as unresolved by the UN Convention, careful inspection of the phrasing of the UN Convention
strongly suggests that equitable utilization is favored over no substantial harm. Article 7 addresses a State’s responsibility to cause no
significant harm to another State.229 However, Article 7.1 includes
the language “take all appropriate measures,” and 7.2 includes the
statement “having due regard for the provisions of articles 5 and 6,”
which are the very articles addressing equal utilization.230 Furthermore, Article 10 provides that “[i]n the event of a conflict,” the conflict “shall be resolved with reference to articles 5 to 7.”231 Based on
these statements, one can easily conclude that no significant harm
certainly does not prevail over equitable utilization. Supporting this
conclusion is a relevant example used by McCaffrey regarding the inclusion of these statements:
This would presumably mean that if State A’s hydroelectric use
conflicts with State B’s agricultural use, the conflict is not to be resolved solely by applying the ‘no-harm’ rule of Article 7, but rather
through reference to the ‘package’ of articles setting forth the principles of both equitable utilisation and ‘no-harm.’232

The Berlin Rules attempt to eliminate controversy between equitable utilization and no significant harm by adopting the following
language in Article 12:
1. Basin States shall in their respective territories manage the waters of an international drainage basin in an equitable and reasonable manner having due regard for the obligation not to cause significant harm to other basin States.
2. In particular, basin States shall develop and use the waters of
the basin in order to attain the optimal and sustainable use thereof and benefits therefrom, taking into account the interests

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 116-17.
Id. at 117 (citation omitted).
See id.
UN Convention, supra note 176, art. 7.
Id.
Id. art. 10.
McCaffrey, supra note 192, at 255.
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of other basin States, consistent with adequate protection of
the waters.233

This phrasing “emphasizes that the right to an equitable and reasonable share of the waters of an international drainage basin carries
with it certain duties in the use of those waters.”234 Similar to both
the Helsinki Rules and the UN Convention, the Berlin Rules include
factors to determine whether a use, such as the construction and use
of a hydroelectric dam, is an equitable and reasonable use of a transboundary watercourse.235 However, the Berlin Rules emphasize sustainability and prevention of environmental harm by adding two additional factors.236
(d) States’ Duty to Cooperate
It is widely recognized that “[t]he duty of cooperation is the most
basic principle underlying international water law.”237 Without State
cooperation, it would ultimately prove impossible for States to fulfill
obligations prescribed to them through the many sources of international law.238 Article 6 of the UN Convention provides that “watercourse States concerned shall, when the need arises, enter into consultations in a spirit of cooperation.”239
Article 8 further provides that in States’ determinations regarding
the manner of cooperation, “watercourse States may consider the establishment of joint mechanisms or commissions.”240 While this is
merely a suggestion, as it uses the word “consider,” many scholars
deem this ideal.241 This proposition is the best approach because use
of a joint mechanism will assist when two riparian states disagree as
to what activities will provide “ ‘optimal utilisation and adequate
protection.’ ”242 Such a joint mechanism will allow individuals from

233. Berlin Rules, supra note 138, art. 12.
234. Id. art. 12 cmt.
235. See id. art. 13.
236. Id. (adding “[t]he sustainability of proposed or existing uses” and “[t]he minimization of environmental harm” to its list of factors).
237. Id. art. 11 cmts. (noting that in addition to the Berlin Rules, the Helsinki Rules
and other international environmental law documents recognize this rule).
238. See id.
239. UN Convention, supra note 176, art. 6. The UN Convention furthers its emphasis
on participation by including this statement within the same article (Article 5) in which it
lists the elements. Id. art. 5.
240. Id. art. 8. Indeed, a paragraph was added to Article 8 of the UN Convention regarding the use of joint mechanisms or commissions because “delegations negotiating the
Convention attached such a significance to cooperation through joint mechanisms.”
McCaffrey, supra note 192, at 253; see, e.g., infra Part VI.A. (explaining the creation of the
International Joint Commission between the United States and Canada).
241. See, e.g., McCaffrey, supra note 192, at 253.
242. Id. (quoting UN Convention, supra note 176, art. 8).
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each State to mutually determine whether the States should permit
certain uses of the transboundary watercourse.
Article 9 also states that “watercourse States shall on a regular
basis exchange readily available data and information on the condition of the watercourse.”243 This contributes to the requirement for
State cooperation because without cooperation, it would be impossible to provide each other with this required information. Additionally, Article 10’s statement that “no use of an international watercourse enjoys inherent priority over other uses,” except where
agreement or custom specifies otherwise, also shows that States
must work together to determine the equitable and reasonable uses of
a watercourse, rather than one State assuming and declaring that its
use has priority.244
(e) Dispute Avoidance and Settlement
The Helsinki Rules, the UN Convention, and the Berlin Rules all
provide information regarding prevention of disputes, and since disputes are many times inevitable, these sources also provide dispute
resolution information for use when disputes actually occur.245 Because all three sources provide relatively similar provisions, dispute
resolution information is not a main focus of this Comment. It should
be noted, however, that the inclusion of this information in agreements regarding transboundary watercourses and hydroelectric
dams is especially important as it ensures that a harmed party will
have a mechanism for legal enforcement.

243. UN Convention, supra note 176, art. 9.
244. Id. art. 10.
245. See generally UN Convention, supra note 176, arts. 11-19, 30, 33, annex arts. 1-14;
Berlin Rules, supra note 138, arts. 56-73; Helsinki Rules, supra note 177, arts. XXVIXXXVII. UN Convention Part III, entitled Planned Measures, sets forth a framework for
avoiding and handling disputes between watercourse States. See UN Convention, supra
note 176, arts. 11-18, 33. Article 12, requiring notice, provides that before implementing
“planned measures which may have a significant adverse effect upon other watercourse
States,” the State is required to give those States “timely notification.” Id. art. 12. This notification should include technical data and results from environmental impact statements.
Id. This information should be given “in order to enable the notified States to evaluate the
possible effects of the planned measures.” Id. The UN Convention Article 13 then specifies
a time period for reply to notification, obligations of the notifying state during the reply period, information regarding the reply to the notification, and information regarding an absence of reply to notification. Id. art. 13. Article 17 addresses consultations and negotiations, further showing the importance of State cooperation. See id. art. 17.
For those situations in which one State fails to give notice to another affected State,
Article 18 provides procedures for the absence of notification. Id. art. 18. It states that
where one “watercourse State has reasonable grounds to believe that another watercourse
State is planning measures that may have a significant adverse effect upon it,” the affected
State may request the planning State to comply with Article 12, by giving such notification
of harm. Id. Article 33 specifically addresses settlement of inevitable disputes. See id. art. 33.
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(f) Additional Relevant Articles of the UN Convention
(i) Ecosystems and Marine Environment
As discussed previously, the effects of hydroelectric dam construction can affect rivers and the supported ecosystems immensely. The
UN Convention includes specific language addressing ecosystems
that is directly relevant to hydroelectric dams.246 Article 20 provides
that “[w]atercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, jointly, protect and preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses.”247 Likewise, Article 23 of the UN Convention specifically
addresses the duty of watercourse States to “take all measures with
respect to an international watercourse that are necessary to protect
and preserve the marine environment, including estuaries, taking into account generally accepted international rules and standards.”248
In a sense, these UN Convention articles enhance the widely accepted Principle of Sustainable Development but on a more focused
issue directly applicable to transboundary watercourses.
(ii) Hydraulic Works
The UN Convention also incorporated language specifically applicable to “regulation” of the natural flows of transboundary watercourses by stating in Article 25 that “[w]atercourse States shall cooperate, where appropriate, to respond to needs or opportunities for
regulation” and that “[u]nless otherwise agreed, watercourse States
shall participate on an equitable basis in the construction and maintenance or defrayal of the costs of such regulation works.”249
In addition to general consultation requirements set forth for
transboundary watercourses in Article 24,250 Article 26 includes consultations directly applying to one State being harmed by the installations of another State. Article 26.2 provides the following:
Watercourse States shall, at the request of any of them which has
reasonable grounds to believe that it may suffer significant adverse effects, enter into consultations with regard to:

246. See UN Convention, supra note 176, art. 20.
247. Id.
248. Id. art. 23.
249. Id. art 25. Article 25 defines “regulation” as “the use of hydraulic works or any
other continuing measure to alter, vary or otherwise control the flow of the waters of an international watercourse.” Id.
250. Id. art. 24. Article 24.1 provides that “[w]atercourse States shall, at the request of
any of them, enter into consultations concerning the management of an international watercourse, which may include the establishment of a joint management mechanism.” Id.
Article 24.2 further provides that “ ‘management’ refers, in particular, to: (a) Planning the
sustainable development of an international watercourse and providing for the implementation of any plans adopted; and (b) Otherwise promoting the rational and optimal utilization, protection and control of the watercourse.” Id.
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(a) The safe operation and maintenance of installations, facilities
or other works related to an international watercourse; and
(b) The protection of installations, facilities or other works from
wilful or negligent acts or the forces of nature.251

V. ENFORCEMENT AND ITS COMPLICATIONS
A. Legal Enforcement
While various mechanisms exist to address problems and disputes, a major impediment is enforcement.252 This Section will focus
on several enforcement deficiencies with regard to the sources of international environmental law relevant to the construction and use
of hydroelectric dams.
1. Relevant Law Is Nonbinding
One common enforcement problem is that often the relevant international law is simply not binding, and where the law is nonbinding, a harmed State has no mechanism to force the harming State to
comply.253 This may arise either because the relevant international
law is a nonbinding source that is not considered to be customary international law and thus binding on no States or because the relevant binding sources are not binding on the particular State causing
the harm.254
While the Helsinki Rules and the UN Convention provide enforcement provisions specifically relevant to disputes resulting from
hydroelectric dam construction and use,255 these sources are not necessarily binding. The Helsinki Rules are likely widely considered customary international law, in which case they are binding.256 However, the UN Convention, while continuously gaining acceptance and
251. Id. art. 26.
252. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 114, at 14.
253. See id. at 14-15.
254. See id.
255. See supra Part IV.B.1.
256. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text. Article XXX of the Helsinki Rules
provides that “[i]n case of a dispute between States as to their legal rights or other interests,” negotiation should be sought. Helsinki Rules, supra note 177, art. XXX. If both states
consider the problem to be “incapable of resolution,” then Article XXXII “recommend[s]
that they seek the good offices, or jointly request the mediation of a third State, of a qualified international organization or of a qualified person.” Id. art. XXXII. One such example
is the creation of the International Joint Commission by the United States and Canada to
handle such disputes. See infra Part VI.A. Further, where such states are still unsuccessful at resolving their problems, then Article XXXIII “recommend[s] that they form a commission of inquiry or an ad hoc conciliation commission,” which will try to “find a solution,
likely to be accepted by the States concerned, of any dispute as to their legal rights.” Helsinki Rules, supra note 177, art. XXXIII. As a last resort, Article XXXIV “recommend[s]
that the States concerned agree to submit their legal disputes to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal, to a permanent arbitral tribunal or to the International Court of Justice.” Id.
art. XXXIV.
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having the UN’s endorsement, has not come into force and is not yet
considered customary international law and thus binds no State to
its framework of enforcement mechanisms.257
Should the UN Convention eventually come into force, assuming
it would not yet be widely accepted as customary international law, it
will only bind those States that ratify it.258 Additionally, the UN Convention is meant to solely be a framework—used as a starting point
for States with such transboundary watercourse issues to build upon
when generating their own agreements.259
2. No Attached Enforcement Mechanism
A second major impediment to enforcement—presuming that relevant international law is binding upon the harming State—is that
there is not always an enforcement mechanism attached to the applicable law, and if there is, there is not always a way to force the harming party to submit to that mechanism. This is the classic problem
with customary international law principles, as they do not typically
define “required behavior.”260 Instead,
these rules state international duties that are too vague to provide
any guidance about what behavior is acceptable or to facilitate
ready application of these rules to specific disputes. When publicists endow these abstract duties with substantive content and attempt to generate determinate outcomes for future disputes, they
inevitably privilege the interests of some states over others.261

Further, many States, especially developing nations, “refuse to consider themselves bound by rules of customary international law,
however determinate the rules may be.”262 Thus, while Stockholm
Principle 21,263 the duty of States to cooperate,264 and likely the Precautionary Principle265 are customary international law and are
therefore binding, a harmed State may have no authority to force the
harming State to a particular, or any, enforcement mechanism.
Even the International Court of Justice does not have the power
to force a State to submit to its jurisdiction.266 Thus, in order to es257. See supra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
258. Scott Barrett, International Cooperation and the International Commons, 10
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 131, 139 (“A country only needs to comply with a treaty to
which it is a party.”).
259. See generally UN Convention, supra note 176.
260. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 114, at 15.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
266. See Aloysius P. Llamzon, Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the
International Court of Justice, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815, 815 (2007).
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tablish ICJ jurisdiction over a State, the State must either have voluntarily submitted to the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction or have
agreed in a treaty that in the event of dispute the parties would
submit the case to the ICJ.267
To minimize the problem of no available mechanism to force a
harming State to submit to a particular mechanism, many treaties,
both multilateral and bilateral, provide enforcement mechanisms
that are binding on the party States.268 Ideally, transboundary States
will choose to create treaties for transboundary waters and, more
specifically, when a hydroelectric dam project is proposed for that
river. These treaties prove beneficial, when drafted properly, because
they can incorporate—and essentially codify—general principles,
such as the Precautionary Principle, and relevant international watercourse law, such as the UN Convention. Use of such incorporation
to address the construction and use of hydroelectric dams will ideally
include enforcement mechanisms. When these enforcement mechanisms are incorporated into a treaty, in times of dispute, party States
are then required to submit to that mechanism and consider the rendered decision binding.
3. Rendered Decision May Not Mean that the Problem Is Solved
A third enforcement problem is that even when States adhere to
their duties of cooperation during a dispute and thus submit their
case to the mechanism they previously designated through agreement, the eventual rendered decision may not always resolve
the dispute.269
B. Nonlegal Forms of Enforcement
Realistically, because of these enforcement deficiencies, many
times a harming State may halt or change its activities not based on
the enforcement of an international environmental law, but through
other nonlegal mechanisms. One general principle is the idea of reciprocity.270 A harming State may determine that although a certain
action would be a good economic decision for the State, taking such
an action will then leave open the door, and in a sense encourage,
other States to take the same action.271 Thus, a State may determine

267. See id. at 844; see also infra Part VI.C. (demonstrating the difficulty of enforcement when a State is in noncompliance with customary international law).
268. See, e.g., infra Part VI.A.
269. See, e.g., infra Part VI.B (discussing an ICJ decision that did not resolve Hungary
and Slovakia’s dispute regarding a set of locks on the Danube River).
270. Barrett, supra note 258, at 133 n.6 (stating that “[c]ooperation may be sustained . . . by using a strategy of reciprocity”).
271. See id. at 132-35.

2009]

HYDROELECTRIC DAMS

523

that although a project would currently benefit the State, when other
neighboring States take the same action, the State will be harmed.272
Additionally, a harming State may be forced into compliance with
the applicable laws or forced to abort or alter a harmful project not
because of international environmental law itself, but because of international pressure.273 International groups and leaders are likely to
contact the State to show disfavor and lack of support. Additionally,
a harming State is likely to receive hostile opinion and disruption
from both its own citizens and the affected citizens of other States,
and, possibly, even citizens internationally.
Damage to a State’s reputation from noncompliance is injurious;
such noncompliance may deter other States from entering into future
agreements with the deviant State. A State’s deviation from the law
is problematic because “even a single deviation carries the risk of
precipitating general erosion in law abidance, to the detriment of
all states.”274
VI. APPLICATION TO HYDROELECTRIC DAMS
Even though many States attempt to maintain good relations and
exert effort to manage transboundary watercourses, ultimately, in
times of need, each State will presumably still act according to what
is best for its own State. Thus, many times when one upstream State
envisions an economic benefit from the construction of a hydroelectric dam, that State may simply choose to take action regardless of
the expense and harm the project will cause to other States which
have rights to the same transboundary watercourse. Therefore, a sad
reality is that many times States are harmed, and although there are
relevant international environmental laws, the harmed State may
still not be able to receive justice.
As noted, many multilateral and bilateral treaties contain specific
enforcement mechanisms that the parties agree to follow in the event
of later dispute, which do help avoid the problem of relying solely on
the other State to abide by customary international law.275 As Principle 24 of the Stockholm Declaration provides, many times such bilateral agreements should be and are created specifically to deal with
the watercourse issues that the neighboring States may be facing.276
Such bilateral agreements for actions like hydroelectric dam con272. See id.
273. See, e.g., infra notes 338-44 and accompanying text (discussing a letter to the Brazilian government signed by multiple organizations and individuals to show disapproval of
the government’s actions).
274. Barrett, supra note 258, at 139.
275. For an example of a bilateral treaty containing specific enforcement mechanisms,
see Part VI.A.
276. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 116, princ. 24.
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struction and management will not necessarily prevent disputes from
arising, but will ideally contain, with detail, enforcement mechanisms that the parties will use in case of dispute as well as contain an
agreement to treat such decisions as binding.
Several relevant agreements (and lack of agreements) regarding
hydroelectric dams and transboundary watercourses are identified in
the following discussion. These situations exemplify the importance
of bilateral agreements, yet show the enforcement deficiencies of relevant international environmental law—even when bilateral agreements exist.
A. United States and Canada
The United States and Canada have recognized for many years
the necessity for joint specifications and a specific joint body to address transboundary water issues.277 The Boundary Waters Treaty
was created in 1909 to “prevent disputes regarding the use of boundary waters and to settle all questions which [were then] pending between the United States and . . . Canada.”278
In Article II of the Boundary Waters Treaty, the United States
and Canada agreed that while either State has “the exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion, whether temporary or
permanent, of all waters on its own side of the line which in their
natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary
waters,” any such diversion “resulting in any injury on the other side
of the boundary . . . shall give rise to the same rights and entitle the
injured parties to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place
in the Country where such diversion or interference occurs.”279 This
recognition shows the States’ regard for Principle 21, the basic customary international law principle of the right of a State to develop
and exploit its own resources, but only to the extent that it does not
harm other States.
The Boundary Waters Treaty additionally creates the requirement in Article IV that neither party will create “any remedial or
protective works or any dams or other obstructions in waters flowing
from boundary waters” where it results in raising the waters on one
side of the boundary “unless the construction or maintenance thereof
is approved by the . . . International Joint Commission.”280 This ar277. See generally Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to
Boundary Waters Between the United States and Canada, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Jan. 11, 1909, 36
Stat. 2448 [hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty].
278. Id. When the treaty was initially created in 1909, the parties were the United
States and “His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and
of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, [and the] Emperor of India.” Id.
279. Id. art. II.
280. Id. art. IV.
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ticle creates a legally binding formulation of the general principle of
cooperation; without this “codification,” the duty to cooperate may
otherwise be unenforceable.281 Additionally, harming States are obligated to consult with those States which are negatively impacted;
this concept was later codified in relevant sources of law.282
The International Joint Commission (IJC) was created in Article
VII of the treaty.283 Through its creation, both the United States and
Canada recognized that each State’s action regarding the “lake and
river systems along the border” affect the other.284 Through the IJC,
“[t]he two countries cooperate to manage these waters wisely and to
protect them for the benefit of today’s citizens and future generations.”285 While the Boundary Waters Treaty was created long before
the creation of either the Helsinki Rules or the UN Convention, the
treaty’s creation of the IJC shows a valuable concept, which was codified and emphasized in these later sources.286
The Columbia River Treaty, also between the United States and
Canada, specifically addresses the Columbia River basin rather than
all transboundary waterways between the two States as did the
Boundary Waters Treaty.287 The existence of the Columbia River
Treaty itself helps prove the overall effectiveness of the Boundary
Waters Treaty, and specifically the IJC:
Canada and the United States, in the years since the [Boundary
Waters Treaty], often with the assistance of the International
Joint Commission created by the [Treaty], have concluded several
river agreements, the most important of which is the 1964 Columbia River Treaty. This accord resolved one of the most acrimonious
boundary water conflicts between the two countries.288
281. See supra Part IV.A.2(c).
282. See UN Convention, supra note 176, arts. 7-8; Berlin Rules, supra note 138, art.
11; Helsinki Rules, supra note 177, art. XXIX.
283. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 277, art. VII.
284. International Joint Commission, Who We Are, http://www.ijc.org/en/background/
ijc_cmi_nature.htm (last visited June 1, 2009).
285. Id. Note, however, that while many of the same themes were agreed to through
the creation of these treaties, neither the United States nor Canada ratified the UN Convention. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 183.
286. The creation of the IJC shows yet another application of including general principles in a bilateral treaty, which ultimately makes those otherwise unenforceable principles legally binding, Specifically, the IJC clearly recognizes the overall themes of the Precautionary Principle and the Principle of Sustainable Development. This is clear based on
the Treaty’s focus on the States working together to preserve the water for today’s use
(presumably by doing careful analyses of impacts on the environment of each State) and by
doing this in such a way so as to preserve for future generations. See generally Boundary
Waters Treaty, supra note 277.
287. See generally Treaty Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Resources
of the Columbia River Basin, U.S.-Can., Jan. 17, 1961, 15 U.S.T. 1555 [hereinafter Columbia River Treaty].
288. Patricia Wouters, Foreword to INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS
OF PROFESSOR CHARLES B. BOURNE, at xv (Patricia Wouters ed., 1997) (citations omitted).
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The Columbia River Treaty specifically sets out development requirements for both the United States and Canada and arrangements for implementation.289 Article XV establishes a Permanent
Engineering Board that, among other things, ensures that the Treaty’s objectives are being met.290 Article XVI then specifies that those
differences arising under the Treaty that cannot be resolved may be
referred to the IJC by either State.291 If the IJC does not make a determination within three months, either party may then “submit the
difference to arbitration by written notice to the other.”292 The Treaty
then provides details about the arbitrational tribunal.293
Although these treaties and the creation of the IJC have not completely prevented disagreement between the United States and Canada,294 they provide procedures and mechanisms that, overall, have
assisted the States in working through their differences and ultimately reach agreements regarding shared water basins.295 Additionally, the very existence of the IJC is an important attribute, as many
States have no joint mechanism to deal with transboundary watercourse decisions and disputes.296
289. Columbia River Treaty, supra note 287, art. II (development by Canada); id. art.
III (development by United States); id. art. XIV (arrangements for implementation).
290. Id. art. XV, § 2. The Permanent Engineering Board is also required to “assemble
records” of the river flows of the boundary between the United States and Canada, report
to the countries when there is “substantial deviation from the hydroelectric and flood control operating plans,” “assist in reconciling differences” between the countries regarding
“technical or operational matters,” periodically inspect to “ensur[e] that the objectives of
the Treaty are being met,” report to the United States and Canada “at least once a year of
the results being achieved under the Treaty,” and “investigate and report” on other matters that arise “within the scope of the Treaty” when either country requests. Id.
291. Id. art. XVI, § 1.
292. Id. art. XVI, § 2.
293. Id. art. XVI, § 3.
294. Specifically, the existence of the Boundary Waters Treaty did not prevent dispute
regarding the Columbia River; thus the Columbia River Treaty was created. See supra
note 287 and accompanying text. Likewise, the Columbia River Treaty did not completely
deter dispute. For example, “when the term of the sale of downstream benefits under [the
Columbia River Treaty] expired, a new agreement . . . was reached only after considerable
controversy and disagreement.” Wouters, supra note 288, at xv (emphasis added).
295. INST. FOR U.S. POLICY RESEARCH, UNIV. OF CALGARY, CONFERENCE REPORT,
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER POLICY ISSUES: THE WESTERN NORTH AMERICAN REGION 1 (2007)
(noting that while transboundary water “is very much under dispute, . . . Canada and the
United States have been relatively successful in negotiating transboundary water where
others have been less successful”); Stephen J. Randall, Executive Summary, in 2 INST. FOR
U.S. POLICY RESEARCH, TRANS-BOUNDARY WATER POLICY ISSUES: THE WESTERN NORTH
AMERICAN REGION, OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES SPECIAL ED. 1, 1 (2008) (“[I]n spite of the
cross border disputes that have arisen between Canada and the United States the two
countries actually have an envious record in resolving disputes, as for instance in the case
of the Columbia Basin Treaty and the longstanding work of the International Joint Commission (IJC).”); see also text accompanying supra note 288.
296. See INST. FOR U.S. POLICY RESEARCH, supra note 295, at 1; Randall, supra note
295, at 1 (emphasizing that much of the successful negotiating between the United States
and Canada is a result of the IJC’s effectiveness, and that fifty-five of the fifty-six disputes
submitted to the IJC were resolved unanimously).
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B. Hungary and Slovakia
An examination of the highly publicized dispute between Hungary
and Slovakia demonstrates that even when a final decision of the ICJ
is rendered, the dispute may still not be resolved.297 Hungary and
Slovakia signed a bilateral treaty in September 16, 1977, which entered into force on June 30, 1978, regarding construction and operation of the GabĀíkovo-Nagymaros System of Locks in the Danube
River, which included a hydroelectric power plant.298 The 1977 Treaty also set forth specific procedures for dispute resolution.299
Hungary never began part of the construction that the agreement
mandated.300 Hungary claimed that there was not “adequate knowledge of the consequences of environmental risks” and that more studies were necessary.301 In response, Slovakia diverted the Danube
River and implemented a “provisional solution,” aiming to provide
the benefits that it had anticipated receiving from the system
of locks.302
Hungary and Slovakia each claimed that the other violated the
1977 Treaty, based on different theories of violation.303 All attempts
to use the designated enforcement procedures set forth in the 1977
Treaty failed, and eventually the case was submitted to the ICJ,
which had been agreed upon in the 1977 Treaty as the court of last
resort.304 The ICJ held that both parties had violated international
law but, ultimately, without giving specific instructions on what each
State was then to do, said that the Treaty as agreed upon was still in
force.305 The ICJ provided that Hungary and Slovakia had a duty to
negotiate and, while doing so, to take into account the principles of
environmental law.306
Ultimately, although the ICJ rendered a decision, the dispute was
not completely resolved.307 There has been at least one appeal to the
ICJ for an additional judgment,308 and there have been multiple negation attempts between Hungary and Slovakia.309 Specifically, after
the ICJ’s decision, Hungary and Slovakia entered into negotiations,
297. Case Concerning the GabĀíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J.
7, 42 (Sept. 25).
298. Id. at 14, 20.
299. Id. at 23.
300. Id. at 31-33.
301. Id.
302. Wouters, supra note 288, at xviii.
303. GabĀíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. 7 at 15-16, 35-38; Wouters, supra note
288, at xviii.
304. GabĀíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. 7 at 11.
305. Id. at 54-56; see also Llamzon, supra note 266, at 833.
306. Llamzon, supra note 266, at 833.
307. See id. at 833-34.
308. Id. at 833.
309. Id.
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which “broke down” in 1998.310 After negotiations failed, Slovakia requested the ICJ give another judgment because of Hungary’s alleged
unwillingness to negotiate in good faith.311 In 2002 and 2003, there
was “some talk” that Slovakia would return to the ICJ.312 In 2004,
following a two-year period of no negotiation, Hungary and Slovakia
each announced that they were willing to continue negotiations for
implementation of the original ICJ decision.313 These negotiations,
however, apparently accomplished very little.314
C. Brazil and Bolivia
Yet another unfortunate example of the difficulty of enforcement
is the present dispute between Brazil and Bolivia. “The eternal tension between Brazil’s need for economic growth and the damage that
[it] can cause to the environment are nowhere more visible than here
in this corner of the western Amazon region.”315 This dispute not only
demonstrates a State’s internal struggle between its need for efficient energy and its efforts toward environmental preservation, but it
also shows the direct application, or rather the lack thereof, of international environmental laws and their enforcement.
Brazil, one of the world’s leading dam-building nations,316 is currently demonstrating the extent of international dispute resulting
from a State’s lack of regard for the environment, transboundary
States, and the relevant law. In 2007, the Brazilian government approved other hydroelectric dam projects, including the Santo Antonio
and Jirau dams, which will be constructed on the Madeira River.317
According to Glenn Switkes, Director of International Rivers Network’s Latin America office, these projects “[will] dam the Amazon’s
principal tributary, causing dramatic changes to the riverine ecology
and affect[] thousands of families who depend on the river for income, nutrition, and agriculture.”318
Before the project’s approval, and even since its approval, the
project has stirred ongoing controversy both within Brazil and internationally, based largely on the environmental impacts on neighbor310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 834.
314. Id.
315. Rohter, supra note 48.
316. Press Release, World Commission on Dams, Brazil: A Major Hydro Power (Aug.
11, 1999), http://www.dams.org/news_events/press309.htm (“Brazil is one of the [countries]
most dependent on hydroelectricity, with 96.9 per cent of power generated coming from its
600 dams.”).
317. Gary Duffy, Brazil Gives Amazon Dams Go-Ahead, BBC NEWS, July 10, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6286804.stm; Switkes, supra note 80.
318. Switkes, supra note 80, at 1.
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ing Bolivia.319 Proponents of the Santo Antonio and Jirau dams claim
that without the dams, serious blackouts will result in Brazil, and
they assert that construction of the dams will create many new
jobs.320 However, “[a]s environmentalists see it, the dams, one of
which is to be barely 20 miles from Brazil’s border with Bolivia, will
not only add to the strains on the Amazon, but also generate tensions
within the country and between Brazil and its neighbors.”321
Independent studies prepared by the state public attorney’s office
in Rôndonia, Brazil and by IBAMA, the Brazilian government’s environmental agency (under the previous executive board),
confirm what environmentalists and social movements have
feared—that the Madeira project would cause enormous impacts.
These would be felt over thousands of kilometers, from the mouth
of the mighty Amazon and up the Madeira into neighboring Bolivia and Peru. A principal factor is the Madeira’s extremely high
sediment load—the river carries millions of tons of clay, sand, and
silt from the Andean slopes where it is born to the Amazon River,
where it accounts for half of all the sediments along the lower
Amazon. Studies have shown that when the dams begin operation,
the upstream Jirau reservoir would fill up with sediments, extending the flooded area into rainforests in neighboring Bolivia. The
retention of these sediments behind the walls of the dams would
also rob downstream floodplains of the precious nutrients that
fertilize agricultural lands and help sustain the Madeira’s incredible biodiversity . . . .322

Additionally, critics claim that the dams will put thirty-three endangered mammal species at risk of extinction, including the spotted jaguar, giant anteater, giant armadillo, and giant otter.323
319. See generally id.
320. Rohter, supra note 48.
321. Id. “[T]he dispute . . . appears to have more to do with politics and economics than
science and nature.” Id. The political debate regarding the hydroelectric dams is further
complicated by the countries’ animosity regarding other current issues. Ivo Cassol, governor of the Brazilian state of Rôndonia stated that “ ‘Bolivia has no reason to meddle in this
matter,’ ‘[t]hey’ve already given us enough problems.’ ” Id.
322. Switkes, supra note 80, at 2; see also Michael Kepp, Brazil-Bolivia Joint Work
Group to Study Environment Impacts of Amazon Dam, INT’L ENV’T DAILY, Dec. 28, 2006. In
November 2006, Rondonia’s own public prosecutor who was personally concerned about the
thoroughness of the [environmental impact study] and its supplementary studies, asked an independent group of researchers to do its own studies on the
dams, which it passed on to IBAMA in December [2006] . . . . The researchers’
studies showed that, because of the Madeira River’s high sediment load, the
dams could block sediment passage, thus denying the organic material to the
downstream food chain in the dam’s reservoirs and that the dams could block
the migration of spawning fish.
Id.
323. Int’l Rivers Network, The Amazon Under Threat: Damming the Madeira 1-2,
http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/MadeiraFact.pdf (last visited June 1, 2009).

530

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:487

On July 9, 2007, IBAMA granted the preliminary license for the
construction of the project.324 IBAMA eventually released the final
report in November 2007.325 It took IBAMA approximately two years
to approve the project, and even with passage, IBAMA included thirty-three conditions with which the winning consortium
must comply.326
On December 10, 2007, despite the ongoing controversy, the Brazilian government auctioned off the construction contract for the
Santo Antonio dam.327 A few days earlier, on December 6, 2007,
Friends of the Earth-Brazilian Amazon filed an injunction to suspend
the December 10th auction and argued that “the IBAMA technical
team recommended through its impact assessment that neither Madeira River dam should receive a preliminary environmental license.”328 On the morning of the auction, dissatisfied Brazilian
groups delayed the start of the auction and disrupted the bidding
process, claiming that the project would “displace thousands and
harm the environment”; protesters were ultimately forced to stop by
Brazilian police officers.329
In August 2008, the Brazilian government officially granted the
consortium a license for the Santo Antonio Dam project.330 Additionally, Brazil sent eviction notices to 3,000 indigenous people living in
the area of the dam construction, requiring that they “abandon their
lands” by August 30, 2008.331 Construction on the Santo Antonio dam

324. FRIENDS OF THE EARTH BRAZIL ET AL., THE AMAZON RIVER’S LARGEST TRIBUTARY
IS UNDER THREAT 11 (2007); see also Duffy, supra note 317.
325. Bank Info. Ctr., Environmentalists Go to Court to Suspend the Auction of Rio
Madeira Dam Project (Dec. 6, 2007), http://www.bicusa.org/en/Article.10602.aspx.
326. Duffy, supra note 317.
327. Alan Clendenning, Brazilian Consortium to Build Amazon Dam (Dec. 10, 2007),
http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/latin-america/brazilian-dams/brazilian-consortiumbuild-amazon-dam.
328. Michael Kepp, Brazil Auctions Madeira Dam Concession Despite Protests over Environmental Issues, INT’L ENV’T DAILY, Dec. 11, 2007.
“Our injunction request was based on IBAMA ignoring its own in-house technical team’s recommendation not to license the dams, firing the head of its licensing department, and hiring outside consultants who gave the dam complex
a more favorable recommendation, one which allowed IBAMA in July to give
both dams the preliminary licenses needed to auction them,” [Gustavo Pimentel, Friends of the Earth-Brazilian Amazon’s eco-finance manager] told BNA.
Id.
329. Clendenning, supra note 327.
330. Press Release, Glenn Switkes, Gustavo Pimentel & Iremar Ferreira, Environmentalists Blast Construction License for Amazon Dam (Aug. 14, 2008),
http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/node/3226.
331. Intercontinental Cry, Indigenous Bolivians Declare Emergency over Brazil Dams,
July 14, 2008, http://intercontinentalcry.org/indigenous-bolivians-declare-emergency-overbrazil-dams.
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began in September 2008,332 and the dam is expected to be functioning in 2012.333 Most recently, on December 23, 2008, IBAMA fined
the consortium constructing the Santo Antonio dam the equivalent of
over $3 million for killing eleven tons of fish, including catfish, during the dam’s initial construction phases.334 Also in December 2008,
the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) announced that
it would fund sixty percent of the project, an amount less than it had
initially promised.335 This decrease was “apparently because even
BNDES is scared about the project’s risks and wants to share them
with other investors.”336 The “mass killing” of fish337 along with the
decrease in funding demonstrates that critics’ concerns about the
dam project are likely very accurate.
Glenn Switkes commented in 2007 that “[a]round the world,
people are appalled by the cynical and dishonest manner in which
the Brazilian government has side-stepped due process and pushed
through the Madeira Dams, despite evidence that they will have
massive impacts on the Amazon Basin ecology.”338
Global dissatisfaction is apparent through a September 21, 2007,
Coalition letter written to Brazilian Foreign Relations Minister Celso
Amorim and Brazilian Presidential Chief-of-Staff Dilma Rousseff.339
Although it is not apparent (or at least not yet) in this particular controversy, this letter shows how a State may be pressured into complying with international environmental laws even where it is initially willing to violate.340 The Coalition letter contains an extensive list
of individuals and organizations that support “the formation of binational working groups [between Brazil and Bolivia] to assess the
potential impacts on Bolivia of the Santo Antonio and Jirau dams on
the Madeira River, the Amazon’s principal tributary.”341
332. Dead Catfish May Be the Least of Lula’s Worries (Dec. 23, 2008),
http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/blog/aviva-imhof/dead-catfish-may-be-least-lulas-worries.
333. Clendenning, supra note 327.
334. Brazilian Agency Fines Dam Consortium for Fish Kill, 32 INTL. ENV’T REP.
30 (2009).
335. Dead Catfish May Be the Least of Lula’s Worries, supra note 332.
336. Id. (reporting that the riskiness of the project seems to be the culmination of concerns about both environmental risks and the “global financial implosion”).
337. Id.
338. Press Release, International Rivers, Auctioning off the Amazon: Brazil’s Madeira
River
Auction
Sparks
Anger,
Protests,
Lawsuits
(Dec.
10,
2007),
http://www.internationalrivers.org/node/2347. At the international level, to show opposition “activists barraged Brazilian embassies and consulates in the United States, Argentina, Holland, Belgium, and other countries with phone calls, and faxes, and e-mailed President Lula.” Id.
339. Letter from Associãçao Terra Laranjeiras et al., to Celso Amorim, Braz. Foreign
Relations Minister, and Dilma Roussef, Braz. Presidential Chief-of-Staff (Sept. 21, 2007),
http://www.amazonwatch.org/newsroom/view_news.php?id=1464 [hereinafter Coalition
Letter]; see also Press Release, Switkes, Pimentel & Ferreira, supra note 330.
340. Coalition Letter, supra note 339.
341. Id.
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The letter addresses the relevant harm by stating that “[o]fficial
project studies and independent expert opinions indicate that there
is a distinct probability that Bolivia could suffer flooding of territories . . . ; loss of fish species and serious impacts on some of the most
important fish currently populating the upper Madeira; and
health impacts.”342
Further, the coalition addresses Brazil’s legal duty by stating that
[t]he need for prior assessment of the possibility of negative impacts of this significance using the “precautionary principle” is affirmed in international treaties, including the Montreal Protocol
(1987) and the Rio de Janeiro Declaration on Environment and
Development (1992). The Convention on Biological Diversity
(1992), which both Bolivia and Brazil have subscribed to, holds
that sovereign states have “the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”343

The letter concludes by emphasizing that the Coalition “trust[s] that
representatives of civil society organizations (CSOs) and independent
technical experts will be guaranteed participation in [the] process,
and that the working group meetings will be conducted in a transparent manner.”344
Although Brazilian supporters have circumvented this necessity
and moved forward with the preparation and actual construction of
these dams, by law, Brazil is obligated to consider the potential impact to the entire river basin.345 Thus, in its determination to construct the Santo Antonio and Jirau dams, Brazil should have considered (and should continue to consider) the effects to Peru and Bolivia, both of which are in the same river basin.346

342. Id.
343. Id. This letter specifically shows how although the listed treaties are not binding
on every country worldwide, in this instance, the Convention on Biological Diversity, is
binding on both Bolivia and Brazil because they have each signed the treaty. Thus, Brazil
is legally obligated to ensure that its activities do not damage Bolivia’s environment. While
the Convention on Biological Diversity is outside the scope of this Comment, because Brazil is legally bound to its enforcement mechanisms, it may be an enforcement route by
which Bolivia could take action.
344. Id.
345. Rohter, supra note 48.
346. See id. As an aside, note that in December 2006, Brazil and Bolivia did actually
agree to establish a bilateral work group after Bolivia “expressed concerns about the environmental impact” of Brazil’s planned dam construction. Kepp, supra note 322. In requesting this joint work group, Bolivia cited to a 2002 agreement between the two countries
which required a “ ‘rational use’ of hydro resources along their common border.” Id. Unfortunately, however, the work group “ha[d] no power to effect the project or its licensing,”
and based on Brazil’s actions since early 2007, it appears that Bolivia was unsuccessful
with any attempts to prevent Brazil from moving forward. Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
A. Regarding Environmental Harm
While on the surface each State seems interested in preserving international watercourses, it can be presumed that, naturally, each
State’s ultimate concern is the effect on its own territory. Assuming
this is true, each State is only secondarily concerned with the eventual effects of its actions on other States.
While there is much opposition regarding hydroelectric dams,
most of these opponents “do not believe that [any] dam should ever
be constructed.”347 Rather, they simply believe that development
projects, including dams, “should only be built after all relevant
project information has been made public; the claims of project promoters of the economic, environmental, and social benefits and costs
of projects are verified by independent experts; and when affected
people agree that the project should be built.”348
This position is justified. Hydroelectric dam construction should
not be eliminated, as there indeed are advantages to these dams, especially as a source of reliable energy production. But each State
clearly has an obligation, and should fulfill that obligation, to thoroughly plan and analyze the likely effects of a proposed hydroelectric dam before construction begins, even where a State considers the
construction to be hugely profitable and a necessity for energy purposes. This would ensure compliance with such concepts as equitable
utilization, by ensuring that the construction is truly the optimal
equitable and reasonable use of the watercourse itself, rather than
simply an equitable and reasonable use for the particular State. A
State’s concern regarding the condition of its environment would also
be in line with general principles of international law, namely the
Precautionary Principle and Principle of Sustainable Development.
B. Regarding Brazil and Bolivia Specifically
Because customary international law is binding on all States, with
regard to Brazil and Bolivia, Stockholm Principle 21 is definitely
binding,349 the duty to cooperate is definitely binding,350 and the Precautionary Principle is likely binding (depending upon which argument prevails regarding whether the principle truly is customary international law).351 Further, while the Principle of Sustainable Development is not clearly customary international law, it still receives

347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

Frequently Asked Questions About Dams, supra note 26.
Id.
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 166, 171-72 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
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widespread use throughout the international community,352 and thus
it would not be unreasonable for one of those countries to presume
that the other should adhere to the principle. Unfortunately, however, these principles lack any definite enforcement mechanisms and
thus it is in essence impossible for Bolivia to force Brazil to comply
based on these principles alone.
Additionally, even assuming that the Helsinki Rules are customary international law, there still are no definite enforcement mechanisms within, but rather there is a framework as to how bilateral
agreements should be arranged. Likewise, even if the UN Convention
were actually in force, neither Brazil nor Bolivia has ratified it. Further, even if both parties had ratified it, because it is also a framework convention, without a bilateral treaty specifying enforcement
mechanisms, Bolivia may still have no route for enforcement.
One hope for Bolivia, however, flows from the fact that both Brazil
and Bolivia are parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity.353
Because both are parties, it is binding on each country, and thus Bolivia may be entitled to proceed upon any specified enforcement procedures in the treaty.
C. Regarding Transboundary Water Law
An ideal situation would be one where a straightforward and wellestablished set of laws and an intact precedent—similar to that of
domestic law of the United States and many other countries—
currently existed on the international level. It would further be ideal
if when ambiguities or enforcement problems arise, like those that
exist as a result of the increased use of hydroelectric dams, a legislative body could mandate rules and compliance by a simple enactment
of a relevant statute. While international environmental law sources
relevant to hydroelectric dams, both general and international water
law specific, do exist, an obvious deficiency is that these are not
mandatory; realistically, no such international body has authority to
force every State worldwide to comply.
Although there is no mandatory body, and thus no binding procedure specifically addressing how and when a State may construct
and maintain a hydroelectric dam on a transboundary watercourse,
the sources we do have on the international level, namely the Helsinki Rules and the UN Convention, are a definite start. The Helsinki Rules, in existence since 1966, while never binding, eventually and
for the most part, became customary international law.354

352. See supra notes 155-56.
353. See supra note 343 and accompanying text.
354. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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Over thirty years later, in 1997, the United Nations finally
adopted the UN Convention to address and expand upon those
themes that the ILA had addressed in the Helsinki Rules. As noted
by the UN Convention itself, it is a framework, intended to be expanded upon by States, with consideration to those States’ particular
situations and the transboundary watercourses affected. Although
the UN Convention has not come into force, and although it is not
widely considered customary international law at least at this point,
it is a step toward uniformity in State treatment of international
fresh water issues, namely hydroelectric dams and the effect on other
States. Additionally, the ILA’s adoption of the Berlin Rules in 2004
further demonstrates that this is a body of international law that is
likely evolving, thus (ideally) eventually resulting in a clearer acceptance of these recurring themes.
Important, however, is that while such transboundary watercourse specific sources of law are not clearly binding, there are some
general principles of international environmental law that are binding, such as Stockholm Principle 21, the overall duty to cooperate,
and likely the Precautionary Principle. And, there are other principles not (at least yet) considered customary international law, such
as the Principle of Sustainable Development, that are still important
to international environmental law and adhered to by many States.
Adherence to these recurring themes of international environmental
law requires compliance efforts with an eye toward the effects on
each State’s own environment and economy, as well as an eye toward
the effects on other States.
Although such a scenario is ideal, realistically, it is not likely that
worldwide each State will immediately begin to comply with all
sources of international environmental law by taking into account
both the effects to its own State and to others. This is the case not only because much of the law is not binding, but also because even
where the law is binding, many States will, with little consequence,
refuse to comply because, particularly with customary international
law, there are no mandated enforcement procedures.
On a more plausible scale, however, is a goal for greater acceptance of the use of bilateral treaties between transboundary States
for hydroelectric dam projects. Such use of bilateral treaties would be
consistent with relevant sources of international water law and
would allow consideration to the unique characteristics of the particular States and transboundary waters involved. Additionally, these
bilateral treaties would allow the parties to include provisions important to unique local and regional issues.
The creation of bilateral treaties is certainly not a final resolution
to these transboundary watercourse disputes and enforcement mechanism deficiencies, as bilateral treaties certainly do not guarantee
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that no future disputes will arise. However, even though not perfect,
bilateral treaties do provide binding enforcement mechanisms for
certain principles of customary international law, which otherwise a
country would be unable to enforce.
Even more specific—and in a continued attempt to resolve disputes between States who have negotiated a bilateral treaty—is the
creation of some type of commission, such as the IJC created by the
United States and Canada. These commissions provide a body comprised of individuals from each country that can decide difficult questions, such as those that may evolve through construction and use of
hydroelectric dams on transboundary watercourses.
Overall, in addressing hydroelectric dams, there are, in the author’s opinion, two related, yet distinct, issues: (1) the actual environmental harm caused by dam construction and use; and (2) the
lack of adherence to relevant international environmental law. Of the
two, it is more realistic and more effective to address the deficiencies
of the law itself and aim for international efforts toward both overall
compliance and additional development of the law. By focusing primarily on the law, as opposed to the actual environmental harm,
States will inevitably cause less harm to the environment of their
own territory and the territory of other States.

